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CHAPTER I 
NECESSITY OF A DEFINITION 
About fifty years ago a young Roman boy 
used to play in a triangular shaped piazza 
before the Church of Santa Maria della Pace -
Our Lady of Peace. • •• As the boy began to 
study his Latin he must often have looked up 
to the two Latin inscriptions ••• one on each 
side of a circular portico that bulges out 
from the front of the Church. On one side: 
Erit opus justitiae pax, et cultus justitiae 
silentium et securitas usque in aeternum. ••• 
And on the other side: Orietur in diebus 
nostris at abundantia pacis.I 
That "young Roman boy" was Eugenio Pacelli, the now reigning 
Pope Pius XII. From that pair of inscriptions, .,he must often have 
looked up to", Our Holy Father selected three of the first words 
as a motto for his coat of arms: opus justitiae pax. This motto 
Pius XII has constantly and courageously followed from his peace 
message on the date of his election down to his prayers for peace 
in the present hour. Indeed, "his acts, his words, his prayers 
all speak peace. •• a peace of justice and of charity between men 
and men, g~oups and groups, nations and nations, race and race. 2 
l John P. Delaney, ·~en Vatican Microphones Broke the News to 
the World", America, LX (1939), 608-9. 
2 Lillian Browne-01£, Their Name is Pius, Portraits of Five Great 
MOdern Popes, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941 viii. 
Now, limiting our consideration to a "peace of justice ••• 
between ••• nations and nations", 3 we ask: whence this peace of 
justice and charity of the Pope; whence that ordo, which St. Augus-
tine calls the matter of peace, whose form is tranguillitas!4 
Order, the Scholastics say, is dispositio plurium in unum, a 
directed multiplicity. Direction, of course, implies purpose, a 
goal sought (in unum); a proper disposal of a complexity (dispositio 
plurium) toward that goal demands a guide-post, a norm. Now, when 
these ideas are applied to man and his free actions, the goal becomes 
variously an harmonious domestic, social or political order, indi-
vidual beatitude~ the glory of God Himself; and the guide-post becomes 
the norm of morality. Further, when delimited to man in the inter-
national order, the goal becomes particularly international concord; 
the directive norm, international law. Hence, we see that the tap-
root of the tree of international relations is international law; 
hence we see that peace in the international order is the work of a 
justice based on international law; hence we see, finally, the basic 
import of the general theme of this paper, a clear concept of inter-
national law. 
That this concept needs definition anyone can see from a casual 
3 Ibid., Vl.l.l.o 
4 St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, ed. by B. Dombart, Teubner, Leipzig, 
1877, XIX,l3. 
2 
reading either of popular literature or of official statements and 
documents. To begin, then, with the former. 
In one of the many recent books on peace after victory we read 
the following: 
••• Hitler has struck an unprecedented blow 
against all the well-established standards of 
International Law. It is the very concept of 
International Law which has been injured. Inter-
national Law had slowly grown during at least 200 
years and had assumed, in spite of the continued 
international anarchy, a realtiy in the minds of 
the people.5 
And, this we compare with the following excerpt from a rather extended 
study on the reality of international law. 
Why do Foreign Ministers and Secretaries of 
State consult legal advisers about International 
Law. •• Why does the constitution of the United 
States, which according to Chief Justice I~rshall, 
cannot be presumed to contain any clause which 'is 
intended to be without effect', give Congress the 
power 'to define and punish ••• offenses against 
the law of nations'! ~by has the United States 
Supreme Court, like the courts of most other coun-
tries, asserted that 'International Law is part of 
our law'!6 
Just what each of these authors means by international law we are 
not quite sure; that they seam to mean different things is quite possi-
ble. The author of Victory is Not Enough apparently views international 
law as a dynamic concept that has grown to reality. Mr. Jessup, on the 
contrary, would equate the notion "law of nations" as incorporated in 
5 Egon Ranshoffen-Wertheimer, Victory is Not Enough, W. W. Norton 
& Co., Inc., New York, 1942, 162-3. 
3 
6 Philip C. Jessup, "The Reality of International Law", Foreign Affairs, 
XVIII 1940 244-6. 
our Constitution in 1789 with the concept "international lawtt about 
which present-day Foreign Jfinisters and Secretaries of State consult 
legal advisers.7 His is a. static concept of the law. 
In contrast to these vague uses of the term international law, 
are the two following statements: 
International Law, viewed as a formulation of 
the customs of civilized nations in the conduct of 
their mutual relations, has become a great corpus 
of jurisprudence through the consensus of experts 
working in the field.8 
What we are really fighting for, it begins to 
appear, is the status guo. Or, as others call it, 
international law and order. •• This has for years 
been official U. s. foreign policy. •• The (State) 
Department's most recent clarification of its policy 
is in Peace and War, the ~Vhite Book. •• It may be 
summarized in four principles: (1) respect for the 
territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each 
and all nations; (2) noninterference in the internal 
affairs of other countries; (3) equality of all 
nations, including equality of commercial oppor-
tunity; (4) nondisturba.nce of the status guo except 
by peaceful means. 
These principles are all basic to the code of 
behavior known as international law, as it was gener-
ally understood before this war. Along with the 
first and great commandment of all law - pacta. sunt 
servanda, or "keep your word" - they underlie 
practically all important international treaties, 
customs, and procedures.9 
7 Ibid.' 244. 
8 Owen J. Roberts, Asst. Justice U. S. Supreme Court, .. Supra-
National Law, Vital Speeches, IX (1943), 457-8. 
9 Editorial: "What.!!_ our Foreign Policy", Fortune XXVII (1943), 
126-7. 
4 
Certainly Justice Roberts is definite about the meaning of inter-
• 
national law. Yet at the very time he is limiting hie usage to custom, 
the considered policy of his own State Department is summarized as the 
preservation of the status guo, or, as others call it, "international 
law and order't •1° For one, "the customs of ci vi liz ed nations" are in-
ternational law; for the other, "the status quo" is international law. 
It is not apparent either that the customs of the nations are the statue 
guo. 
In connection with the first of the four principles given above as 
summarized from the White Book, an excerpt from the article on inter-
national law in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences is interesting. 
Peace and War asserted the principle of unimpaired sovereignty as "basic 
to the code of behavior known as international law".11 Borchard's 
article in the Encyclopaedia states that international law, if it is 
law at all, "must necessarily limit the omnipotence or sovereignty of 
the State" •12 
The note of doubt sounded by the last authority over our unknown 
soldier, international law, is also heard in different keys and with 
varying degrees of lugubriousness. Some would assert with Elihu Root 
that"international law was not like a tea-cup or a pitcher which, once 
10 ~. 126. 
11 ~. 127. 
12 Edwin M. Borchard, "International Law", Encyclopaedia of Social 
Sciences, Macmillan, New York, 1937, VIII, 172. 
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broken, was irretrievably ruined''.l3 Some would, with Robert Strausz-
Hupe, admit that the leopard changed his spots and, consequently, the 
lebensraum "replaces the obsolete principle of International Law".14 
Some finally, would openly affirm with a former Assistant Secretary of 
State that 
In former years we were intent upon discussing 
the content and the rule of International Law, -
what it permits under a given situation and what it 
prohibits. Now we are reduced to the stark question 
of whether or not a law of nationsl5 ·is to be recog-
nized as in existence.l6 
Popular literature, then, presents a crazy-quilt of meanings for 
the term international law.17 Surely, though, the language of official 
document and pronouncement will be more clear. Let us see. 
13 Elihu Root, Address at Disarmament Conference, Washington, 1921. 
14 Geopolitics, Putnam, New York, 1942, 87. 
15 On the term, law of nations, it might be thought some agreement 
could be found. Recall, however, that by the Constitution Con-. 
grass has power to punish ''offenses against the law of nations", 
6 
or international law. In this sense of international law, Francis 
Sayre uses the term, law of nations. Another authority, however, 
calmly disrupts this agreement in meaning with the following 
statement: "Las droit des gens se superpose done aux droit nationaux 
au sommet de l'Jdifice juridigue universal. 
Ce~endent le droit des gens lui-meme se divise en plusieurs 
degree. 
Lee degree superieurs sont constitues par 
international commun sur le uel se basent lee re les articulieres ... 
A. Verdross, "droit International de la Paix", Recueil de Cours, 
Academia de droit International, Libraire Hachette, Paris, 1931, 
XXX (1929), 292). 
16 Francis B. Sayre, "The Challenge of International Law", Vital 
Speeches, IV (1938), 467-8. 
17 We have cited here but a few of the many examples of divergence 
that could be adduced. If the reader would care to search farther 
afield he will find the following references helpful: Aufrieht, A., 
It is his impression that the American Govern-
ment is now resorting, under plea of self-defense, 
to measures over and beyond those that are generally 
recognized by International Law.l8 
Here, the term international law, might have any of the several 
meanings met with above and yet, whatever the meaning, it should ac-
cord, one would think, with the language of similar official documents. 
"Personality in International Law••, Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. XXXVII, 
217-43. 
Beck, "Future of International Law"", Cath. Mind XLI, 48-53. 
________ __,"Essential Conditions for International Order.,, 
Tablet, CLXXX, 112-3, 237-8, 260-l, 284-5, 535-6. 
Fenwick, C., "International Law and Order", Commonweal, XXXIV, 
94-6. 
Finlayson, C., "Vitoria, the Founder of International Law pro-
vides guidance for Today", Commonweal, XXXVII, l0-12. 
Hartnett, R., "A Good Look Backwards Gives a Better View Forwards", 
America, LXIX, 677-8, 781-2. 
Hoffman, R., "American Tradition and the Coming Peace•, Thought, 
XVIII, 197-201. 
Jessup, P., "Reality of International Law; Vital Factor in War-
Time Diplomacy", Current History, LI, 13-15. 
Keenan, c., "World Order Requires Rule of Law, Not of Men", 
America, LXVIII, 705-6. 
Masse, B., "Popes want Peace .. , Catholic Mind, XLI, 12-20. 
Masterson, W., "What is Left of International Law", Scholastic, 
XXXVI, 8-9. 
Payzo, T., "The Organization of International Law", America, LXIX, 
289-90. 
Rueve, s., "Some Thoughts on International Law", Modern Schoolman, 
XVII, 27-8. 
Ward, B., "International Order and the Natural Law, Blackfriars, 
XXIV, 258-63. 
Williams, B., nvv'hat is International Law", Scholastic, XLII, 7-8. 
18 Nomura, Japanese Ambassador, "Document Handed by Japanese Ambassa-
dor to the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941", transl. 
(tentative) by Joseph C. Grew, Prelude to Infamy, Official Report 
on the Final Phase of United States-Japanese Relations, October 17-
December 7, 1941, United States News, New York, 1942, 15. 
7 
Still, we read: 
We, (Germany) followed these rules and would 
like to follow them in the future. It is entirely 
up to England to carry out her blockade in a form 
compatible with international law or incompatible 
with international law. We will adapt ourselves 
thereto.l9 
In the first statement the United States is accused of not 
following directions as indicated by the sign-post of international 
law. In the second, Germany would follow directions but the 
directions here are indicated by a weather-vane, English procedure. 
To the first party, the norm of law is an absolute; to the second, 
it seems relative, conditional. 
that 
The Covenant of the League of Nations states in the preamble 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES 
In order to promote international co-
operation and to achieve international peace 
and security 
by the acceptance of obligations not to 
resort to war, 
by the prescription of open, just and 
honorable relations between nations, 
by the firm establishment of the under-
standings of international law as the actual 
rule of conduct among Governments, ••• 20 
while further on in Article XIII, we read: 
19 A. Hitler, Speech at Danzig, September 19, 1939 in My New Order 
ed. Raoul de Roussy de Sales, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 
1941, 452. 
20 "The Covenant of the League of Nations", in J. Eppstein, Catholic 
Tradition of the Law of Nations, Catholic Assoc. for Inter-
national Peace, Washington, 1935, Appendix III, 475-488. 
8 
Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, 
as to any question of international law, as to the 
existence of any fact which, if established, would 
constit11te a breach of any international obliga-
tion, or as to the extent or nature of the repara-
tion to be made for any such breach, are declared 
to be among those which are generally suitable for 
submission to arbitration or judicial settlament.21 
How is the term, international law, understood in this official 
document? Messrs. Simonds and Emeny interpret for us: 
Vfuat, after all, is the primary condition of 
any international association which is not fore-
doomed to futility? Obviously an agreement on the 
part of all nations, ••• not merely to respect the 
territorial integrity and political independence of 
one another, but also to take common action against 
any nation, great or small, which violates this funda-
mental contract. That commitment Woodrow Wilson 
himself correctly described as the very heart of the 
whole league conception. For, if nations will not 
obey the law, then the law has no moral validity; and 
if they will not agree to enforce it, then it can have 
no practical value.22 
Here is a law, then, which, according to competent interpreters, 
once broken no longer has moral validity. Yet of this same inter-
national law (at least the same words are used though the meanings 
are obviously different) Pius XI said: 
It cannot be denied that in the Middle Ages 
this law (international) was often violated; still 
it always existed as an ideal, according to which 
one might judge the acts of nations, ••• 23 
21 Ibid., 480. 
22 Simonds and Emeny, Great Powers in World Politics, American Book 
Co., New York, 1937, 556-7. 
9 
23 Pius XI, Ubi Arcano Dei, in Koenig, Principles of Peace, N. C. W. C. 
Bruce, Washington, 1943, 347. 
If the law is not obeyed, then it has no moral value, the inter-
praters say; "often violated; still it always existed", the Pope said. 
As if confusion were not enough, we find it thrice confounded 
when we place three other documents in parallel. Firstly, 
secondly, 
The Governments of the American Republics, 
having considered ••• th~t Pan-Americanism, as 
a principle of American International Law ••• 
requires the proclamation of pri~ciples of 
American International Law, ••• 2 
In order to free the Germans rama~n~ng in 
Poland as well as the Poles remaining in Germany, 
from the feeling of being deprived of the bene-
fits of international law ••• 25 
and, lastly, 
Moreover, since the world seems to have for-
gotten the peaceful message of Christ, ••• We 
have been forced to witness a series of acts 
irreconcilable alike with the precepts of posi-
tive international law and those of the law of 
nature, as well as with the elementary sentiments 
of humanity; ••• 26 
There can, be, then, under one meaning, an American international law. 
Yet according to the general denotation of the words there seems to 
24 "Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and 
Cooperation", in Simonds & Emeny, lxvii. 
25 "Proposal for a Settlement of the Problem of Danzig and the 
Polish Corridor and of the German-Polish Minorities Question", 
transl. in Document on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of the 
War, publsh. by German Foreign Office, German Library of Infor-
mation, New York, 1940, 488. 
26 Pius XII, In Questo Giorno, in Koenig, 634. 
10 
be a contradiction involved. By another terminology, there can be 
an appeal to the benefits of international law for the individual. 
Yet, again, the terms "international" and "individual" seem to act 
at cross purposes. There can be, by a third interpretation, a poai-
tive international law. And this, of course, further complicates 
matters by implying its correlative, natural international law. 
As a summary and symbol, then, of all this lack of agreement in 
fundamental terminology27 , let us use a picture and its caption as 
they appeared in a recent number of a current magazine. The picture: 
ll 
27 It should be noted that when we spoke of "confusion", "divergence", 
"lack of agreement" in terminology we neither approved nor con-
demned anyone. Our purpose was to show objectively from actual 
citation different uses of the term, international law, in both 
popular and official literature. Our purpose was to show ob-
jectively the need of a definition. For as M. Strupp says: "Il 
a uel ues ann~es un auteur de droit internationaYbien connu 
le professeur Spiropoulos de l'Universit de Salonigue, a remar-
gue a justa titre_Jll!.~une grande :eartie des difficultes et con-
troverses concernant le droit international provient de ce gue 
chacun s' obstinant a trouver une definition pour telle ou telle 
concept~on, use d'une nouvelle terminologie et gui lui est propre". 
(K. Strupp, "Droit de la Paix", Recueil des Cours, XLVII, 268). 
Again, Should the reader desire other examples of confused 
terminology in official documents he will find the following 
citations helpful: 
.. Declaration made by the German and Polish Governments", Docu-
ments of Events Preceding War, No. 37. 
Hitler, My New Order, Speech to Reichstag, 367. 
~cit., Speech to Duesseldorf Industry Club, 96-7. 
"Lateran Treaty", in Parsons, Pope and Italy, America Press, 
New York 1929, 85, 87, 88, 92. 
Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, in Koenig, 594, 604, 605. 
------------------------' Quoniam Paachalia, in I<Denig, 558. 
an off-angle photo of the United States' State Department buildings 
as seen over the shoulders of armed sentries, through the bars of 
the high iron fence. The caption: "The New Headquarters of Inter-
national Law: State Department, 'ilashington, D. c.n28 
The work of this paper, then, is that of the diamond master: 
the cutting and polishing of the international-law concept until it 
is ready to be set as the main stone in the ring of international 
union. Our procedure will be, first, to trace the history of the 
concept; secondly, to take the trinity of accepted founders of modern 
international law, Francis Vitoria, Francis Suarez and Hugo Grotius, 
together with the two War Popes, Benedict XV and Pius XII, and extract 
from their principal writings the notes they would each contribute to 
a joint definition of international law. Finally, we will formulate 
and explain a definition of this law in the light of the foregoing 
study. 
28 Fortune, XXVII, (1943), 126. 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT 
St. 1bomas, when evolving his general definition of law, posits a 
broad, generally accepted, working notion of his term as a point of de-
parture.1 Following this example and having'an eye to delimiting the 
field of examination, we forthwith present a working definition (merely 
etymological) of international law. International law is a rule of 
the actions of nations in dealing with one another. 
Let us examine the historical evolution of international law, then, 
as thus broadly characterized. 
Turning back the pages of legal history even to pre-Greek and Roman 
days, it is certain on the basis of actual findings that the ancients 
had laws governing their interrelations and institutions for the execu-
tion of these laws. "The laws of Hrumnurabi, the excavations and papyri 
of Egypt, the tablets of Babylonia and Assyria, etc., brought us an 
2 
abundance of material, so that there can be no doubt on the question••. 
Baron Korff goes on to add even greater details. He says: 
l s. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la llae, 90, l, resp. 
2 Barons. Korff, "An Introduction to the History of International 
law .. , American Journal of International law, XVIII (1924), 246. 
••• glance at the recent discoveries at Sumer, 
dating back to the Fourteenth Millennium B.C. Among 
them was a treaty signed by King Entemena relating 
to boundaries. ••• According to international agree-
ment an umpire or arbiter was appointed in the per-
son of another king, Misilim of Kish. • •• The famous 
treaty of Rameses II concluded in 1280 B.C. • •• is 
the best known case. This was not only a treaty of 
peace imposed on a vanquished opponent, but an alli-
ance for future cooperation.3 
From these facts as premises, we can safely conclude that there 
was an international rule of some sort at least in the world of the 
near-East. 
It is a curious fact, which we would like to consider briefly be-
fore passing on to the times of Socrates and Cicero, that the Oriental 
world was even in this early period well advanced in international af-
fairs. For 
Non seulement elle (la Chine) est arriv~e 
depuis long-temps ••• ala negation de souver-
ainet~ absolue et du droit de guerra arbitraire 
••• et elle a pos~ la les destinctions des •• 
les principes generaux qui commandant le droit 
du 4emps de paix comma celui du temps de guerre 
... 
China's great philosopher, Confucius, even laid down two funda-
mental principles for unity among the Chinese States, namely, first, 
the practice of good faith between the various States and, secondly, 
3 Ibid.' 249. 
Cf. also Paul Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, 
Oxford, New York, 1920, 2 Vole. 
14 
4 L. Le Fur, "La Theorie du Droit Natureln, Recueil des Cours, XVIII,279. 
marmonious concord between these States. 5 The philosopher talks of 
6 
the ~creation d' une 'Grand Union' de tous lea Etats de la Chine". 
And lest anyone think that a union of Chinese States is hardly the 
foundation for an international lew, M. LeFur adds that the very title 
of the Chinese Ruler, "Son of Heaven", was indicative of the Chinese 
mind. To them, indeed, such a union "signifie a la fois la Chine et 
7 le monde". 
15 
To turn back to the West again, let us consider the state of inter-
national law among the Greeks and Romans. 
The question of international law in Greece takes the form of a 
problem: did or could the Greeks have an international law! The 
answer to this question takes the form of contradictories, for, "~ 
ce point ••• deux opinions absolument opposees, contradictoires, disent 
lea meilleurs asprits".8 
1911 is the great divide in the history of Greek international 
law. At that date Coleman Phillipson's authorative work9 on the subject 
appeared. From that date the various currents of this historical 
5 Ibid., 279, {cf. also s. Seferiades, "Droit de la Paix", Recueil 
des Cours, XXXIV, 217-18. 
6 Ibid., 279. 
7 'ibid., 280. 
8 L. Le Fur, 272. 
9 Goleman Phillipson, International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece 
and Rome, Macmillan, London, 1911, 2 Vola. 
problem are reckoned. Either they flow to the left following the 
courses dug by Wheaton, Kent, Lawrence, Mitford, and other predecessors 
of Phillipson;10 or they flow to the right with Korff and Redslob 
through the channel cut by Phillipson himself.11 The former school 
deny there was an international law in Greece; the latter affirm the 
existence of such a law. 
16 
The argument of the "leftiststt may be briefly stated with M. Le Fur, 
thus: "ces auteurs se basent ~ la fois sur les faits et sur les doc-
trines des anciens" .12 The facts are these: 1) There were no inde-
pendent nations at that day, but only the individual Greek city-states, 
beyond the lands of which all were barbarians. 2) If there were any 
relations within the Greek world they were intermunicipal and not inter-
national. 3) There was a continual state of war even in philosophical 
Hallas. 4) There was no regard for the sanctity of treaties and agree-
13 
mente even between the Greeks themselves. The doctrines referred to 
are these: 1) There was a fundamental misconception of international 
relations, even of the law that would govern such relations. 14 2) If 
there was any "international" action, it was based on notions of re-
10 cf. Ibid., 46 and 49. 
11 cf. L. Le Fur, Recueil des Cours, 273; also Korff, Recueil des 
Cours, 1923; and Redslob, Histoire des grandee principes du droit 
des gens. 
12 L. Le Fur, 274. 
13 Ibid., 274. 
14 Phillipson, 46-7; alsoP. Vinogradoff, Historical Types of Inter-
national Law, in Bibliotheca Visseriana, Brill, Leyden, 1923, 13. 
ligion, namely, religious unity and the sanctity and binding force of 
the religious oath.15 Before committing ourselves let us hear the 
17 
affirmative side of the case. To emphasize the antinomy we can summar-
ize the "rightist" argument in the very statement quoted above: "£!! 
\ 
auteurs se basent a la fois sur les faits et sur les doctrines des 
anciens".12 
The facts are thusly marshalled: l) The Greek concept of a state 
was co-extensive with the Greek city which enjoyed, after the fashion 
of the modern nation, independence and autonomy. Whence it follows, 
as Sir Paul Vinogradoff observes, that "the Greek world was particu-
larly well adapted to the development of a certain kind of inter-
national, or, -- to speak more correctly-- inter.municipal relations".16 
Hence, intermunicipal law was as truly international law, as the Greek 
municipality was the counterpart of our nation. 2) Further, not only 
could such laws exist but they did. Economic necessity forced inter-
17 
city relations and a corpus of law governing such. 3) Attempts, at 
least as successful as the League of Nations of our own day, or the 
"Concert of Europe• engineered by Count Metternich in 1815, were made 
at confederation and league formation. "The most potent influence 
15 Phillipson, 49; also Vinogradoff, Historical Outlines, II, 162. 
16 Vinogradoff, Historical Outlines, II, 153; also Vinogradoff, 
Historical Trpes, 13. 
17 Vinogradoff, Historical Outlines, II, 153; also Vinogradoff, 
Historical Types, 15. 
was exercised by the Athenian-Delian league".l8 Then there were the 
Amphictyonie Leagues under obligations endorced by the Amphietyonie 
Council.l9 The attempted consolidations of Themistocles and Pericles 
for the prosecution of the.Peloponnesian war, the oligarchical confed-
eration of Boeotia20 were other moves toward cooperation. It should 
18 
be noted, too, as the protagonists of Greek international law point out, 
that this 
international intercourse was conducted under cus-
tomary rules and under treaties. A number of the 
latter have come down to us ••• and we can judge 
from them to what extent ••• arbitration was re-
sorted to ••• It was a natural outcome of conflicts 
between cities anxious to settle disputes by legal 
process.21 
In fact, taken as a whole these institutions in their origin and in 
their work 
d~montrent de facon peremptoire, semble t-il, 
qu' un droit international de la paix, de nature 
a peu pres analogue ~ cel2e du droit inter-
national de notre epoque. 2 
From the doctrinal standpoint, the case is equally cogent, the "right-
ists" maintain. 1) Numerous authors can be cited in whose works not 
only the notions of law, but the basic notions, at least, of an inter-
national law are found. Thus Sophocles and Aristotle surely had clear 
18 Vinogradoff, Hist. Outlines, II, 158-9; also Hist. Types, 18. 
19 Seferiades, 218; also Korff, 251; Phillipson, 31; Vinogradoff, 
Hist. Types, 21. 
20 Vinogradoff, Hist. Types, 18. 
21 Vinogradoff, Hist. Outlines, II, 160. 
22 Seferiades, 220. 
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notions of a universal law obligatory for all men. The former, speak-
ing through the person of Antigone defies Creon's command in virtue 
of a higher law.23 The latter both in his Rhetoric and in his Politics 
distinguishes between a particular and a universal law which is appli-
cable alike to an individual, a state, or the community of mankind. 24 
Then, too, one has but to glance at the inscriptions, coins, and medals 
of the period as well as the writings of some Greek historians, 
Polybius, Thucydides, Xenophon, Herodotus to be convinced of a Greek 
international law.25 Finally, one well known Greek scholar and legal 
authority affirms 
Something has been said already of the Pan-
hellenic feeling of the fourth century, more 
especially as represented by Socrates, and of 
Plato's sympathy with that feeling. The end of 
the fifth book of the Rtpublic bears evidence ••• 
to the depth of his conviction ••• He advocates 
a foreign policy of alliance, or, at any rate 
amity, among the States of Greece in opposition 
to *barbarians'. ••• T.he permanent interest of 
Plato's argument lies in the light which it 
throws on his ideas of international law and 
international morality. Though he may make the 
State absolute within, Plato is far from thinking 
that it is absolute, or free from limitation, in 
its external life. • •• Plato does not transcend 
the distinction ••• between the Greek and the 
barbarian; ••• but he has a clear conception that 
the Greek world, at any rate, is a single society, 
with a civility or comity of its own, to which all 
its members are bound to conform.26 
23 L. Le Fur, 2?2. 
24 Phillipson, 50-55. 
25 Phillipson, 1, 66. 
26 Barker, Greek Political Theory, Plato and His Predecessors, 
Methuen, London, 1918, 264-5. 
2) By conviction treaties, leagues, and agreements among the Greeks 
27 were fortified by the bond of wages, oaths, or payments to Zeus. 
And to violate such was to lose •race" in the Greek world.28 Conse-
quently, the "rightists" would add as a clinching argument, 
the main difference (between Greek international 
law and ours is) that now our rules mostly flow 
from explicit agreement as representing the major 
premise, whereas in antiquity r.ules of law were not 
only referred to the act of agreement as their 
source but largely to religion and morality as 
necessary by dictating an implicit acceptance or 
agreement.29 
These are the pros and cons of the problem of Greek international 
law. Wherein lies the solution? The dilemma is solved by citing a 
third possibility, namely, the combined truth of the negative and af-
firmative propositions. An example on a question of fact handled in 
scholastic form will clarify the point. Negative side: There were 
no independent nations among the Greeks. Therefore, they could have 
had no international law. Distinguo: There were no nations as we know 
them, we concede; but that there was nothing comparable to our nation, 
we deny. Affirmative side: Greek city-states were independent like 
our nations. But the rule for relations between our nations is inter-
national law. Therefore, the rule of city-state relations is also. 
Distinguo: The city-states are comparable to our nations in the sense 
27 Vinogradoff, Hist. TyPes, 20. 
28 Vinogradoff, Hist. Outlines, II, 162 ff. 
29 Phillipson, 1, 27-28. 
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of being the same in all important respects, we deny; but that there 
is a good analogy in many respects, we concede. 
Hence, we add, a tertium guid really is true. Inasmuch as the 
Greek cities are comparable to our nations (and even an historical 
basis for them) so the laws governing their interrelations are analo-
gous to our international law (and even their legitimate ancestors).30 
Let us conclude by summarizing the whole question with M. Le Fur. 
la solution consists ~ mas yeux dans une dis-
tinction essentielle. Il existe parfois dans 
l' antiquite un droit international se rap-
prochant ~ beaucoups d'egards du notre, mais 
c'est entre cite's voisines de meme langue, de 
m&me race, et de m~me religion, comma dans lee 
amphictiones greques et les confederations 
etrusques; en dehors de ce cas -- auquel il faut 
peut-etre ajouter celui de nations m8me e'tangsres 
de race et religion, mais ayant conclu un trait' 
d'amitie' ou d'aillance garanti par des serments 
religieux, le grand lien d'alorsen principe entre 
nations au cite's etangeres, il n y a pas de droit 
international ou sans actual du mot, parce qu il 
n y a alors ni loi commune, ni reconnaissance de31 l'egalite de droit des diveres races iu nations. 
As we move further West and visit the Romans, we are tempted to 
jump to the conclusion that, if the Greeks had at least an analogous 
international law, surely the Rome of law and order must have far 
outstripped their Hellenic predecessors. The temptation is but a 
"booby-trap", for again a problem faces us; again contrary solutions 
21 
30 cf. Phillipson, 1, 50 and Vinogradoff, Historical Outlines, II, 153. 
31 L. Le Fur, 278. 
are offered. 
The problem here is three-fold: 1) Could and did the Roman world 
admit of an international law; 2) Was the Roman .ius fetiale an inter-
national law; 3) Was the jus gentium of the Romans international law% 
The first of the problems admits of easy solution. The majority 
of writers32 on the possibility and actuality of Roman international 
law would distinguish roughly two periods of Roman history. The first, 
ending somewhat after the Punic wars, was a period when Rome dealt on a 
nation-to-nation basis with other peoples. The second, the latter days 
of the Republic and the period of the Empire, was 
l'lpoque oa Rome crut devoir imposer autour d'elle 
sa paix a elle, la paix romaine, rejetant toute 
conception ~ egalit6 avec see voisins, epoque 
presque contemporains de la fondation de eette cite, 
un droit international, tel que nous le concevous 
de nous jours ou meme tel que nous l'avions recon-
tre dans lee cit~e greques, ne pouvait certainement 
pas exister.33 
22 
Hence, the days which gave foundation for the "grandeur that was Rome"; 
the days in which the Mediterranean could be spoken of as a Roman lake; 
the days when all the world was at peace due to the vast rule of Augus-
tus, were days that could hardly admit of an international law. 34 
With regard to the second problem we need but to nod assent. It 
32 cf. Vinogradoff, Phillipson, Seferiades, LeFur, Korff, Scott, 
et alii. 
33 Seferiades, 288. 
34 It should be noted that even in this latter period, as we shall 
see, Rome had a decided indirect (and even some direct) influence 
on ~he historical development of international law. 
is generally recognized that 
the Roman system of international relations and 
the principles on which these relations were 
based, was embodied in the well-known jus fetiale, 
interpreted and applied by the fetial college 
(Collegium Fetiale).35 
It is likewise recognized that it was the fetial college which acted 
"sur toute question rentrant essentiellement dans le cadre du droit 
. t t• 1 t 1 .1 t . d . " 36 1n erna 1ona , e gu 1 es compr1s e nos JOUr • 
We turn, then, to our final problem: Was the Roman jus gentium 
international law! Throwing out this question is like breaking 
open a bee hive. One is sorely tempted to flee the multiplicity and 
23 
diversity of answers given. Let us gather the opinion into affir-
mative and negative camps. 
On the negative side we find Korff, 37 Vinogradoff, 38 Seferiades, 39 
Sav;gny,40 ·~~ne,41 and others. H · th · · · · • ~· ere 1s e1r op1n1on 1n sum: "~ 
terme m~me de jus gentium, emprunte au droit romain par un nombre 
eleva d1 internationalistes c~l~bres, pour designer lee r~gles du droit 
39 international, doit-il etre considere comma absolument malheureux"! 
What then was jus gentium! It was conflict law or private international 
law. Jus gentium under the Eraetor peregrinus grew up as Rome began 
35 Korff, 252. 
36 Seferiades, 230. 
37 ~ ~' 253. 
38 Historical Types, 25. 
39 ~ ~~ 229. 
40 Phillipson, 1, 71. 
41 ~~ 1, 70-1. 
dealing with others than Romans. "It may be noted that this private 
international law was a ius gentium (italics added} not a jus civita-
t " 38 ~ . t t ~ uuy pr1va e. Because "historical investigation proved ••• 
that (jus gentium} was nothing else but the Roman civil law applied to 
special circumstances concerning the foreigners and the outside, non-
37 Roman, world". It is true the authors on this side of the case have 
a variety of explanations as to the origin and development of jus gen-
42 
~ but the final product for them is a law governing the relations 
of the Roman~ with someone of another nation. 
43 
From the affirmative camp we hear the voices of Puchta, Nettle-
. 44 45 . . 46 
sh1p, Rudorff, and Ph1ll1pson. These legalists would hold with 
the Italian, Baviera, that "jus gentium (when all is said and all dis-
tinctions are made) represents both the private and the public inter-
national law of Rome•.47 And by public international law they would 
48 
mean a law "regulating the rlationships between states gua states". 
24 
Such, briefly, is the case for jus gentium. It remains to be seen 
what conclusion we can come to. 
42 J. Brown Scott, Law, the State, and the International Community, 
Columbia u. Press, New York, 1939, 2 Vole., cf. Vol. I. 
43 Phillipson, 1, 72. 
44 cf. Scott, Vol. I, Appendix. 
45 Phillipson, 1, 75. 
46 ~ ~' esp. 1, 96-110. 
47 Il diritto internationale dei Romani cited in Phillipson, 1, 94. 
48 ~' 1, 75. 
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Clearly, the affirmative side does not deny the case of the 
negative but merely adds that the notion of public international law 
should be included under jus gentium. The truth seems again to lie 
in a distinction. The Romans did have group-to-group relatione with 
the States, tribes, nations about them. And these relations were 
"sometimes referred to under jus fetiale, sometimes jus belli et pacis, 
sometimes jus gentium. These rules did not, of course, constitute an 
international law in the modern sense of the term". 49 Therefore, jus 
gentium was a sort of international law. Yet the very last words of 
the above quotation, "not of course ••• in the modern sense of the 
term" suggests the distinction to be made. We must take jus gentium 
as international analogo sensu. 50 
In concluding this consideration of international law in Rome a 
final word from Coleman Phillipson is enlightening; "In the inter-
national transactions of Rome", he says, "especially in her earlier 
period, bona fides was taken to be the fundamental principle of 
aeguita1.51 These words sound notes in harmony with those of the 
present Sovereign Pontiff who has warned us on several occasions that 
basic trust and brotherhood of mankind are necessary foundation stones 
for any international order. 
49 Phillipson, 1, 96. 
50 Ibid., 1, 106-8. 
51 Ibid., 1, 119. 
As we were talking of Rome time changed its markings from "B.C." 
to ''A.D." In fact, with the passing of Rome around 500 A.D. we find 
ourselves in the Middle Ages. Vfuat does this fourth and final period 
offer us for our historical sketch of international law! 
The Middle Ages offer 1) example, 2) an indirect and 3) a direct 
contribution to the development of international law. 
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1. The Example: M. Le Fur in his fine study already quoted asks what 
moment we should point to as that in which was realized "cette vocation 
universelle de toutes les nations civilisees $. un droit"! And he an-
swers: "Pour moi, sans ancun doute, ~ l'apparition du christianisme".52 
Christianity put a new twist to the late Roman period and it continued, 
even increased, its action into the Middle Ages. It was the basic 
notion of the equality of men, and therefore of states, before God; 
it was the grand conception of the Mystical Body which united all men 
and emphasized thereby the order necessary in the reciprocal relations 
of man-to-man and people-to-people; it was the new cast given society 
and man's life that made Christianity an exemplar in the field of 
international law, that enabled the Auddle Ages to contribute directly 
and indirectly to the development of international law. 
2. The Indirect Contribution: Indeed, "with an entirely different 
practical spirit ••• the institutions of international law developed 
52 ~ ~. 281. 
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in the Middle Agesn. Creating this "practical spirit" were saints 
and scholars of the new church. nSaint Augustin est le premier ~ 
l'avoir expos~e dune facon developpee dans sa cel&bre Cite du Dieu". 54 
He traced a jus gentium in broad outline, clarifying the distinction 
of natural, eternal, and civil law; he touched many knotty inter-
national problems, discussing the justice of wars, slavery, and the 
55 
rule of law necessary in the City of God. 
Contemporaneous with and subsequent to Augustine were a series 
of Roman Pontiffs who emphasized the rule of the "double-edged swordtt; 
who pointed to the universal spiritual authority of the Holy See and 
the harmony that should reign under this spiritual rule among all te~ 
poral sovereignties. Such was the work of an Ambrose, a Gregory 
the Great, an Innocent III, and a Boniface VIII. 
At the same time a group of lawyers headed by Ulpian, Gratian and 
Bartolus, were developing the notions of Roman law, giving definition 
to jus gentium, clarifying the concept of jus naturale. For, Ulpian's 
56 wri tinge were "considered as having the effect and force of statutes"; 
Gratian's Decretum was destined to preserve and enhance the contribu-
53 Korff, 255. 
54 Le Fur, 286. 
55 cf. Jean Kosters, "Le 'Droit des Gens" chez Saint-Augustin", 
Revue de Droit International, XIV (1933), 31-61, 282-317, 
635-676. 
56 Scott, 1, 114. 
tion of Isidore of Seville; 57 Bartolus was the most famous of the 
later Medieval commentators on Roman law. 58 
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Toward the end of this whole tradition we find the Angelic Doctor 
who would be famous if he "ne fait que Ereciser et developper ces 
grandee lignes (those of Augustine mentioned above) avec son esprit 
de methode habituel". 59 It was he, who has joined the legal threads 
of the past into a close-woven definition of law. 60 
This then is the indirect contribution of the medievalists, and 
especially {under the inspiration of the Church be it noted) of the 
medieval churchmen. 
3. The Direct Contribution: Though Baron Korff cites several in-
stances of a real codification of international law in Medieval times, 
("such were the different medieval codes of maritime law, the Tables 
of Amalfi, the Consolato del l~re, the Venetian Code of 1255, and the 
laws of Visby"} 61 still the principal direct contribution in this 
field is a curious phenomenon. Prohetic of the future predominance 
of Spain in the development of modern international law, we find in 
Etymologiae of St. Isidore of Seville une definition (of international 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Scott, 1, 204, quoting Figgis, Pol. Aspects, p. 92. 
Ibid., 1, 248-50. 
Le Fur, 286. 
cf. S. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a IIae, 90, 4, resp.: "Et sic 
ex, guatuor praedictis poteet colligi definitio legis, quae nihil 
aliud est guam guaedam rationis ordinatis ad bonum commune, et ab 
eo ~ui curam communitatis habet, promulgata." 
Kor r, 256. 
r 
law) ou, pour employer un terme plus exact, une description qui se 
rapproche beaucoup de la conception moderneff. 62 The import of St. 
Isidore's contribution is well summarized for us by the great Belgian 
jurist we have just quoted. He says 
Dans see Etymologiae, Isidore de Seville, 
••• emprunte la d~finition du droit introduite 
par Ulpian, et divise le droit en jus naturale, 
jus civile, et jus gentium. Il comprend dans le 
droit des gens, jus gentium, une s~rie de matieres 
qui rentrent dans notre notion actuelle dun aye-
tame de droit des gens. • •• i~3admet m3me un droit militaire, jus militare. 
And the subject-matter of this last named ~ Nys goes on to say, re-
sembles the chapter headings of a modern work on war. 
* * 
These are .the materials, then, of the past, the deposit, as it 
were, of a combined Ancient, Greco-Roman, and Medieval tradition. 
As a summary and symbol of this historical tradition, let us paint a 
second scene, this time a diptych; let us write a double caption. The 
first picture: Christopher Columbus landing with his crew on San 
29 
Salvador in the West Indies. Its caption: Discovery of the New World: 
the gateway to modern empire-building and world relations. The second 
picture: The Vatican Palaces. Its caption: Home of the Vicar of the 
62 E. Nys, Le Droit International, les Principes, lee Theories, lee 
Faits, 2nd Ed., Castaigne and Fontemoing, Brussels, 1904, SO. 
63 Ibid., so. 
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Prince of Peace. The summary lies in this that Columbus' dis-
covary focused all previous work in international law and emphasized 
especially the Church's continued contribution to the international 
field. 
With the discovery of America, too, a new phase in national rela-
tions began. Vitoria was asked to pronounce on the Indo-Spanish 
relations in the New World. Suarez followed to unify and give philo-
sophical foundation to the pronouncements of his Dominican contemporary. 
Grotius succeeded both as the popularizer of the work of the theo-
logians.64 And now today, as in the First World War, the pope is the 
guardian of order and peace among men; he is the guardian of law. 
What, therefore, did Vitoria, Suarez, and Grotius, who had the 
role of legislators for this new era, have to say of international 
law! V~t did Benedict XV and Pius XII, who have had the role of 
defenders in the war-days of our century, have to say of international 
law! 
64 J. B. Scott, Catholic Conception of International Law, George-
town u. Press, Washington, D. c., 1934, 127 n. 
CHAPI'ER III 
THE ELEMENTS OF A DEFINITION 
We c~~ readily picture ourselves present in an imaginary conference 
called by Pius XII to marshall the notions requisite for a definition of 
international law. Seated at the head of the council table would be our 
present Holy Father; to his right, his predecessor, defendant of inter-
national law during World War I, Benedict XV. Ranged along the other 
two sides of the table we would see Francisco de Vitoria,1 Francisco 
Suarez, and Hugo Grotius. 2 The Holy Father would call the conference 
to order; each individual at the table would present his views; particu-
lar points would be re-discussed; and in the end a definition and ex-
ple~ation thereof would be formulated. As we approach the next two 
chapters we might even conceive ourselves as reading the "Report of the 
Proceedings" of this conference, for in reality its content is just that. 
Before hearing from the Dominican, Vitoria, we ask our historical 
advisors, James B. Scott3 and Ernest Nys4 to give us a little background 
for the speaker. 
1 We will use Vitoria or de Vitoria throughout in preference to the 
latinized form Victoria. 
2 Here we prefer the more common Grotius to the Dutch name, Groot. 
3 J. B. Scott, The Spanish Origin of International !.aw, Part I, ~­
cisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations, Carnegie ~ndowmant for 
International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1934, 68-93. 
4 Francisco de Victoria, De Indis_et de Jure Belli Relectiones, ad. 
by E. Nys in "Classics of International La.w", Carnegie Endowment, 
Washington, D.C., 1917, Intro. 9-loo. 
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A. VITORIA 
Francisco presents his notions of international law, they tell us, 
in four works: De Indis Prior, De Indis Posterior seu de Jure Belli, 
De Potesta Civili, and De Jure GentiQm et Naturali.5 As Eri~ profess-
or of theology at Salamanca from 1526-1546 he had delivered these 
lectures wnong many others. Ernest Nys adds that Vitoria's doctrine 
is especially interesting because he was the savior and revivor of 
scholasticism in Spain by his timely injections of Thomistic metaphysics, 
a doctrine he had imbibed from Petrus Bruxellis (Pierro Crochaert) one 
of his professors at Paris, who had styled himself Divi Thomae doctrinae 
interEres et Eropungnator accerimus.6 
And, now, to the theologian's doctrine. 
Vi toria' s whole presentation could be reasoned in summary thus: 
1) The State is a perfect society, but 2) the states of the world are 
yet interdependent. Hence 3) a law is requisite to maint~in inter-
national order and 4) this law is jus gentium, taken as a law of nations. 
Let us now see a verification of all this. 
nRes uublica ErOErie vocatur perfecta corrnnunitas",7 Vitoria says. 
5 The first three named are Relectione~ the last is a commentary 
on the Summa of St. Thomas, II- II, 57, 3. 
6 Nys, preface to Vitoria, .2.E.!. cit., 20 and 66. 
7 De Jure Belli, III (edition by Nys, 277). 
And by a perfect society he meant what Aristotle and St. Thomas before 
h4~ t 8 . d . t 1 t 1 ~ mean , an organ1ze soc1e y comp e e y equipped in itself with the 
means necessary to man's social and political exigencies. 9 There are, 
however, many states in the world a) endowed with integrity, indepen-
dence, and equality;10 b) bound together into one family of nations. 
These two notions Vitoria lays down as the foundation of an inter-
national community, whose legal bond is law. Dr. Verdross analyzes 
well this notion of unity showing at the same time its connection with 
a universal law as well as its ul tirnate foundation. 
la base de cette science nouvelle est la conviction 
de 1' unit~ morale du genre humain, presente deja 
dan l'antiquite, mais affirmie d'un facon nette 
seulement par le christianisme. Pour celui-ci, la 
fraternit~ de tous las hommes n' est qu' una cons~­
quence du monotheisme. Car si las etres humains 
d~pendent du meme Dieu, ils ont tous una base com-
mune qui les unit en una societe humaine universelle. 
••• Vera la fin de cette epoque (Moyen Age), 1' idee 
universaliste se purifia ••• Ainsi naquit dans 
l'esprit de Francois de Vitoria ••• 1' idee d'un 
droit strictement universal, c' est-a-dire, d' un 
droit liant non seulement les Etats chretiens entre 
eux, mais tous las ::!.!tats de l'humanite, 
Car ••• justice internationale n' est pas re-
servee ala chretiente seule • ••• 11 
And why! Because this brotherhood is based on the fact that men ".2.!:!! 
en Dieu le meme pere".ll 
8 s. Thomas, In Octo Libros Politicorum Aristotelis, Laval University, 
Quebec, 1940, Lectio I. 
9 Scott, Catholic ConceEtion, 66. 
10 De India, II {ed. by Nys, 244); of. also Scott, Spanish Origin, 137 
and 281. 
11 A. Verdross, "Droit International de le Paix", Recueil de_s Cours, 
1929, 30, 277-8. 
33 
34 
From.what has been said we conclude with Vitoria that as per-
sons are formed into a civitas civilis and bound under civil law, so 
too this family of nations is a unity and must be bound by an inter-
12 
national law. Whence the question arises: what is this international 
law of Vitoria! Vitoria replies, "quod naturalis ratio inter omnes 
gentes constituit, vocatur jus gentium".13 
International law is jus gentium..1. then. But as Nys well observes, 
Vitoria is here merely quoting the Institutes of Justinian and that 
rather poorly since he inserts the word gentes for the word homines 
which his authority used. Did Vitoria quote roughly from memory or was 
this change a deliberate one! Again, following the Belgian jurist, we 
have only to quote the very next sentence of the De India, which begins 
"sic enim apud omnes nationes ••• ,"14 to show Vitoria's mind.
14 
Gentes 
for Vitoria was not an ambiguous synonym for the homines of Justinian's 
original. It meant what the context clearly shows it to mean, nationes. 
Hence, the Spanish Dominican is here giving us a law which is the measure 
of the dealings between states or nations as such. 15 
This jus genti~~, however, we have seen to be variously inter-
preted by both ancient and medieval writers. In what sense, then, we 
12 De Indis, III, 2 (ed. by Nys, 257). 
13 De Indis, III, 2 (ed. by Nys, 257). 
14 Nys' interpretation on this point as seen in the "Introduction" 
to his edition of Vitoria is the accepted one. 
15 Verdross, on. cit., 278-9. 
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ask, _did Vitoria use the term jus gentium! Was it natural law for 
him or was it positive law! And, if the latter, what kind of positive 
law was jus gentium! 
Now, natural law for Vitoria was that dictamen rectae rationis 
which he found in his texts, Thomas and Aristotle. Indeed, from a com-
mentary on a fragment of the II-II, 57, 3 of the Summa. Theologica we 
see that Vitoria accepts the Angelic Doctor's definition of natural law 
and proceeds immediately to comment on its relation to jus gentium.16 
And how are these two related! 
" ••• We say with St. Thomas that the natural 
law is an absolute good, and not a relative good; 
but the jus gentium is only relatively good, there-
fore it is said that the jus gentium is not equity 
of itself from its own nature, but was established 
as inviolable, from agreement among men. And so I 
answer the principal doubt with this conclusion: 
that jus gentium ought to be placed more under 
positive law than under natural law".l7 
Jus gentium, then, for Vitoria, was not that of the Jurisconsults who 
took the term in too wide a sense, but rather it harkens back to Isidore 
of Seville and his definition of jus gentium in Book V of the Etymologiae, 
on which Suarez comments: 
Unde inferius, c. 5 post exempla juris gentium 
(Isidorus) concludit inde jus gentium vocari quod eo 
16 De Jure G. et Nat. cxi; cf. also Spanish Origin, 165-6; 168-9. 
17 Ibid., cxii; for further proof that Vitoria distinguishes natural 
law and jus gentium cf. De Indis Sect. II and III Eassim; De Jure 
Belli, passim; De Jure G. et Nat., Append. E, cxii-cxiii; cf. also 
SEanish Origin, esp. 166-72. 
jure omnes fere gentes utuntur. In quo insuinuat 
definitionem juris gentiQ~ scilicet, esse jus 
commune omnium gentium non instinctu solius naturae, 
sed unu earum constitutum.l8 
Further, jus gentium far Vitoria belongs more to positive law 
than to natural law. But to what sort of positive law! 
" ••• jus gentium is two-fold, just as posi-
tive law is two-fold ••• There is one kind of 
positive law taken from private agreement and 
consensus, and another kind taken from public 
agreement. In like manner vre say of the jus 
gentium that a certain kind of jus genti~ is 
from the common consensus of all peoples and 
nations ••• nl9 
Jus gentium is, then, principally a positive law whose derivation is 
two-fold; first, from natural law since "vel est jus naturale vel 
derivatur ex jure naturali"; 19 and, secondly, from consensus since, 
36 
for those things which come under jus gentium, "consuetudo poteet dare 
facultatem et auctoritatem ••• 1120 It is worthy of note, too, that this 
very consensus, whence jus gentium is partially derived, is in turn 
based on the natural law. For 
n' est done pas un droit impos' par una 
autorite monarchique aux princes suborddones, 
mais un droit introduit sur la base du droit 
natural par le consentement general des nations 
dans 1' interet du bien commun. 2 
18 F. Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislators, Vives, Paris, 1856, II, 
19, 6; cf. Scott, Law, the State, and the International Community, 
Columbia U. Press, New York, 1939, I, 198-200. Also, E. Nys, £! 
Droit des Gens at las Anciens Jurisconsultes Espagnols, Nijhoff, 
'!he Hague, 1914-54. 
19 De Indis, III, 2. 
20 De Jure Belli, 9. 
21 Verdroes, 279. 
The last four words of M. Verdross' statement lead us to a 
final consideration, the obligation of Vitorian jus gentium. Two 
statements from the Dominican theologian himself will sufficiently 
clarify this point. The first from the De India 
at quidem multa hie videntur procedere ex jure 
gentium, quod, quia derivatur sufficienter ex 
jure naturali, manifestam vim habet ad dandum 
jus et obligandum. Et, dato quod non semper 
derivetur ex jure naturali satis esse videtur 
consensus majoris partie totius orbis, maxima 
pro bono communi omnium.22 
The second statement is from the De Potestate Civili. 
International law has not only the force of a pact 
and agreement among men, but also the force of law; 
for the world as a whole, being in a way one single 
State, has the power to create laws that are just 
and fitting for all persons, as are the rules of 
international law. Consequently, it is clear that 
they who violate these international rules, whether 
in peace or in war, commit a mortal sin; moreover, 
in the gravest matters, such as the inviolability 
of ambassadors, it is not permissible for one coun-
try to refuse to be bound by international law, the 
latter being established by the authority of the 
whole world. 23 
An analysis of the first statement yields the following conclusions: 
1) Jus gentium, derived from natural law, takes its binding force from 
24 
that same law; 2) Jus gentium, not derived from the natural law, 
takes its binding force from consensus, inasmuch as a majority consent 
is directed to the common good. 
22 De Indis, III, 7. 
23 De Potestate Civili in Scott, Spanish Origin, xc. 
24 Scott, SpaniSh Origin, 140. 
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A consideration of the second statement yields two other con-
elusions, namely: 3) Jus gentium has the force of law; 4) Jus gentium 
has the force of a pact and agreement among men. 
The conclusions are similar. They all bespeak that bonum commune 
which is the core of obligation as found in St. Thomas' general defini-
tion of law.25 One either reduces the oblig~tion directly to that of 
the natural law, or 
"Si done on soutient que lea Etats sont ob-
liges par le consentement ·general, on presuppose 
d6j~ un principe d'ordre superieur qui oblige lee 
membres de la communaute internationale a se con-
former aux regles creees par la volunte commune. 
Cette regle est le principe qui, la parole donnee, 
doit etre tenu. Ce principe: pacta sunt servanda 
••• Cette regle est un principe du droit natural 
••• n26 
Consequently, the laws of consensus find their obligation reductive in 
the natural law. 
The above statements, however, bring up some interesting points 
which have been implicit in most of our previous discussion. They 
concern types of international law in Vitoria. By way of conclusion, 
let us bring some of these out. 
Vitoria admits international law, jus gentium for him, is funda-
mentally dual: "vel est jus naturale vel derivatur ex jure naturali.tt27 
That is, inasmuch as jus gentium is identified with jus naturale 
25 
26 
27 
s. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-II, 90, 2. 
A. Verdross, "Le Fondement du Droit Internationalu, Recueil de 
Coursa 1927~ 16~- 256. De In is, IJ.I, <:: 
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Vitoria affirms a natural international law; 28 inasmuch as it is a 
derivative of natural law, he affirms a positive international law. 
:B'urther, with equal clarity, Vitoria has said that jus gentium pertains 
more to positive than to natural law, that it pertains to human positive 
rather than divine positive law. He implies, too, that this law is 
generally an unwritten (as opposed to written) law29 which obtains by 
the consent, at least, "ma,joris partis totit1s orbis". 30 True, it could 
also happen, as Vitoria implies, that pacts or agreements could be made 
between just two states or a few states. But then, although freely en-
tered into, although these pacts would bind,32 still the pact itself 
would only be law in an analogous sense. It would not, de facto, be 
imposed by some superior or an inferior, but would rather partake of the 
nature of a bi-lateral or multi-lateral contract freely entered into by 
the parties. This, of course, does not deny the binding force of such 
agreements as based on the natural law. Such, indeed, is the basis of 
28 cf. supra, notes 13, 17, 18, 22, 23. Also to the point are the 
words of Verdross, "mais outre ce droit des gen naturel,.J.l (Vitoria) 
conna~t Etgalement un droit des gen_p positif". tDroit de la Pa.ix",279). 
29 "But there is a doubt whether it may be a sin to viole,te jus gentium 
(to which some have not yet given their sanction), that is to say, 
to viola.ge the law of nations which is unwritten, or even written ••• " 
(Scott, Spanish Origin~ Append. ~. cxii). 
30 cr. supra~ note 22. 
31 cf. De Indis 2 III, 9; also Scott, Spanish Origin, Append. E., 
cxiii-cxiv. 
32 Pe Pot. Civili, xc in Scott, Spanish Origin. 
We might distinguish with Verdross, ttmais outre ce droit des gens 
natural, il (Vitoria) conna1t egalement un droit des gens positif. 
("Droit de la Paix", 279), but this terminology would only confuse 
the distinction we are trying to establish. 
obligation in any contract. It merely emphasizes a point to be con-
sidered more thoroughly later, the fact of an analogous international 
law consequent on agreements of two or a few states. 33 
40 
Thus far then the ideas of the Spanish Pominican. We turn now to 
the "Report" as it were, of his Jesuit compatriot, Francisco Suarez. 
B. SUAREZ 
Two years after the death of Vitoria, in the year 1548, Francisco 
Suarez was born. He turned to the Society of Jesus about the time of 
its ruby jubilee. Like Vitoria, he was in the Thomistic tradition, 
having himself studied at Salamanca where the Spanish Dominican 1~ 
introduced St. Thomas' theology and philosophy. 34 Like Vitoria, Suarez 
taught in Italy (Ron1e) before returning to Spain to take up his life's 
work. Like Vitoria, also, Suarez became a prima professor, but held 
his chair at the University of Coimbra, the Portugese counterpart of 
• I 1 35 Spa~n s Sa amanca. 
It was in this capacity that Suarez wrote the work which especially 
has merited for him a place among international jurists, that is, the 
De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore. If we added to this two-volume work 
Suarez's chapter on war (in the tractate De Tripliei Virtute) and the 
33 Scott, Spanish Origin, in De Jure Gentium et Nat., cxiii. 
34 Scott, Catholic Concention~ 129. 
35 Scott, Spanish Origin, 72. 
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Defensio fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae ~dversus Anglicanae Sectae 
36 Errore~ we would have the Jesuit's complete contribution to law. 
The treaties on Law, however, especially the last few chapters of 
the Second Book, will occupy us in our quest for the Suarezian con-
tribution to international law. VVhat, then, is this contribution! 
The philosophy of international law is, in a word, Suarez's con-
41 
tribution. As James B. Scott notes: ''This philosophy was the contribu-
tion of Suarez, although it may not have been his conscious purpose to 
complete theoretically what Vitoria had begun practically". 37 
"Philosophy of international law11 , such a contribution would seem 
to consist of four elements. 
1. Philosophy: This would imply a reasoned statement which would 
carry us to the ultimate causes of the state, law and especially inter-
national law. It is interesting to note that in his "Proemium"38 
Suarez, like Vitoria,39 justifies a theologian's treating this ••• 
His argur.aent might be summarized in the boast of a great Medievalist 
that the scope of the theologian was "de omni re scibili et quibusdam 
e.liis". 
36 Scott, Catholic Conception, 131. 
37 Ibid.' 129. 
38 De Legibus, ix-xi. 
39 De India, I, 2. 
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2. International: Vlhat would the ultimates of an international 
philosophy be! Surely it should be shown that there are or could be 
nations or state& Secondly, supposing the first statement proved, 
the nature of these nations or states should be clarified. Finally, 
having posited these two premises, the questions of whether there are 
~-relations between these states and, if so, of what sorlthese 
reletions are, should be answered. 
In answering the first two points we might repeat Dr. Scott's 
words: "It will shorten matters here to say that in general the view 
of Suarez concerning the State are those of Vitoria.".40 
Justum est et humanae naturae valde consen-
ta.neum haberi magistratum civilem cum potestate 
temporali ••• Et ratio est, quia cum homo sit 
animal sociale, requiritur in communitate sive 
oeconomica, sive politica, aliqua potestas ad 
quam spectet illum regimen ••• (et) illud con-
firmat universalis hominum consuetudo".41 
In the best Aristotelian scholastic tradition, Suarez would postulate 
a society ratione natura~ which would brin8 with it a temporal power 
42 
regulatory of' this society. Finally, not only could such states exist, 
but they do as "universalis hominum consuetudo" demonstrates. 42 It 
should be noted, too, what type of society Suarez conceived to be thus 
formed. For "comrnunitas" can be variously distinguished. First, into 
40 Scott, Law, the State, and the International Comraunity, I, 561. 
41 F. Noel, Theologiae Fr. Suarez Summa seu Co~pendium, from 
Bibliotheca Cleri Universe., Garnier and Migne, Paris, 1877, 1, 633. 
42 cf. Scott, Catholic ConceQtion, 241. 
43 
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a natural community ''cujus modi est communitas humani generis»; and 
a "communitas politics. vel mysticatt. 43 This latter in turn can be divided 
into a society "jure ... divino, eo quod ab ipso Deo institute situ, and 
a political society of human origin. Such human societies, however, are 
either imperfect, as the family, or perfect "guae est ca~ax politicae 
gubernationis, quae, quatenus talis est dicitur sufficiens in hoc ordine; 
guomodo dixit Aristotelis ••• et D. Thomas ••• civitatem (the state) esse 
communi tatem perfectam''. 44 
Hence, there is a state and it is a perfect society, consequent on 
the exigencies of human nature. vVhat, then, of an international society! 
Let us complete the last quotation and see. Suarez was saying "civitatem 
44 
esse communitatem perfectam" and he adds "et a fortiori regnum, et 
guaelibet alia superior congregatio, seu communitas, cujus pars civitas 
45 
sit, erit comnunitas perfecta". 
The basis of this greater society is the same for Suarez as for 
Vitoria. Dr. Verdross paraphrasing the Jesuit theologian has stated it 
well in connection with the question of the law of nations. 
La raison d' etre du droit des gens ••• c'est 
que le genre humain, bien qu' il soit divise en 
nations et en royaumes differents, constitute 
cependant une certaine unite, non seulernent speci-
fique (c'est-a-dire anthropologique), mais aussi 
politique et morale qui resulte du precepte natural 
de l'amour ~t de la ci~rit~ mutuelle qui doivent 
s'entendre a tous ••• 
43 De Leg. I, 6, 18. 
44 Ibid.s I, 6, 19. 
45 Italics are mine. 
46 Verdross, Droit de le Paix, 280. 
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The family of nations, then, is a political community, because its 
members, the States, are political; it is a social community, because 
man is a social animal; it is a moral community because man's activity 
47 is measured in terms of a moral law. From all this Suarez concludes: 
Quapropter licet quaecumque civitas perfecta, 
respublica, aut regnum, sit in se communitas per-
facta, et suis membris constans, nihilominus quae-
libet illarum est etiam membrum aliquo modo hujus 
universi, prout ad genus hwna.nurn spectat: numquam 
enim illae communitates adeo sint sibi sufficientes 
sigillatim, quin indigeant aliquo mutuo juvamine, 
et societate, ac communicatione, interdum ad melius 
esse majoremque utilitatem, interdurn vero etiam ob 
moralem necessitatem et indigentiam, ut ex ipso usu 
constat.48 
3. Law: The third element of the Suarezian contribution is "law". In 
general, we can say Suarez is again in the Thomistic tradition since 
his final definition of law is that of St. Thomas cited before. Summar-
ized somewhat schematically for emphasis, the notions of Suarez on law 
would read as follows: 
law, in general, can be viewed either according to its con-
stitutive parts or ~ccording to its qualities: 
A. The constitutive parts, in turn, s.re either internal or 
external. 
1. Internally, we have the essence of the law, that 
47 Scott, Catholic Conception, 182. 
48 De Legibus, II, 19, 9. Note: James B. Scott in his work on the 
Catholic Conceution of International Law is ever pausing to com-
pare the views of Suarez and Vitoria. His observations on their 
divergent views of the international community are interesting. 
Suarez, he says, created an international community with law, 
whereas Vi toria • s community was endowed 1ui th the power to create 
law and to punish the violations of that law. {cf. Oath. Conception, 
which constitutes in its proper species this par-
ticular product of the intellect and will as dir-
ective of human conduct. This essence might 
be broken dovvn into matter and form (somewhat 
analogous to the matter and form of physical sub-
stances). Then the matter, materia.circa quam 
in this case, would be human acts and the form, 
the ordination of the legislator. 
2. Externally, we have: 
a. the final cause of law, which directs acts to the 
comnon good of the society or community; 
b. and the efficient cause, which is the legislator, 
the one entrusted with the care of this society. 
B. The qualities, on the other hand, whermvith a law should 
be endowed. They are two-fold: that the law 
1. Should be just, and this with regard 
a. to the method of legislation (justa feratur). This 
looks both 
1) to the legislator -- that he enact justly and 
2) to the law itself -- that it be in accord with 
distributive, commutative, and legal justice; 
b. to the matter (ut ,jus~ feratur). 
2. S~ould be perpetu~l (tum a parte legem ferentis, tum 
subordinatorum, tum materiae legi~. All of which 
implies a perpetuity a parte post, secundum quid, 
negative. 49 
45 
All this leads us to a consideration of the last element in Suarez's 
contribution to international legal science. 
184 ff). Elsewhere the Doctor notes "the international community 
of Suarez (is) ••• inorganic;"Vitoria's, however, is "an organic 
community". (cf. Law, State and International Community, 559). --
This is especially important for us since the same authority points 
out that besides the chief exception, i.e. the international com-
munity, the international ideas of Suarez and Vitoria are similar. 
49 De Legibus, cf. Book I, passi~ for this general treatment. 
4. International Law: This union of the second and third elements 
is the most important for us. Suarez shows, first, the fact of an 
international law. For, continuing the line of reasoning we quoted 
above from II, 19, 9 he says: 
Bac ergo ratione indigent aliquo jure quo 
dirigantur et recta ordinentur in hoc genera 
communicationis et societatis. Et quamvis magna 
ex parte hoc fiat per rationem naturalem; non 
taman sufficienter et immediate quoad omnia: 
ideoque aliqua specialia jura potuerunt usu eorun-
dem gentium introduci.so 
But, we ask, what law fulfills this mission! Suarez continues 
Nam sicut in una civitate vel provincia con-
suetudo introducit jus, ita in universo humano 
genera potuerunt jura gentium moribus introduci. 
Eo vel maxime quod ea ad hoc jus pertinent, et 
pauca sunt, et jure naturali valde propinqua, et 
quae facillimam habent ab illo deductionem, adeoque 
utilem et consentaneam ipsi naturae, ut licet non 
sit evidens deductio tanquam de se omnino necessaria 
ad honestatem morum, sit taman valde conveniens 
naturae et de se accaptabilis ab omnibus. 51 
46 
In sum, then, Suarez's argument runs like this so far. Given the 
unifying basis of hmaan nature, it follows that nations are related. 
And more, that they are members of a universal society, is consequent 
on their insufficiency and their need of mutual assistance. Now, to 
govern their reciprocal relations a system of law is necessary and, 
finally, nature and custom have established such laws in jus naturale 
----------------------------
50 Ibid., II, 19, 9. 
51 De Legibus, II, 19, 9. 
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and jus gentium. 
Now, since natural law is "illa quae huma.nae manti insidet ad 
52 
discernendum hone~tum a tur:ee 11 it binds men whether they act singly 
or collectively and, hence, there can rightly be said to be an inter-
national natural law, which "magna e~ parte"53 covers international 
relations. (Here, of course, Suarez is but following a conception of 
natural law which we have already noted in Vitoria's work and which is 
54 
somewhat verified in St. Thomas.) And yet it is clear that this law 
is insufficient for immediate application to given cases and so Suarez 
47 
rightly postulates a more refined notion in international law as repre-
sented by the term j_us g~ntium. And this jus gentium is ••• ? 
52 Noel, 613. 
53 De Leg. II, 19, 9. 
54 I say "somewhat" because the Angelic Doctor does not use the 
term natural law univocally. Therefore, it might be useful to 
clarify here both Thomas• concept of and his distinctions of natur-
al law from jus gentium. For him, jus naturale, when divided 
according to its comprehension, is tripartite (In Sent. IV, 33, 
1 ad 4): 1) there is the natural law which is dictated by nature 
(when nature is taken as distinguished from reason). 2) there is 
the natural law which is inclusive of the divine law and "guod ••• 
in Evan&~~ ~ontinet~r". And, 3) there is the natural law which 
is the dictate of man's reason. Now, the second of these meanings 
is very broad and of no application to us. The first and third, 
however, do apply, for in these St. Thomas distinguishes natural 
law sensu lato from natural law sensu stricto. Whence it becomes 
clear how Thomas admits of various types of jus gentium~ For 
according to the first meaning we have natural law as common to 
men and animals alike and, hence, from this concept jus gentium is 
obviously distinct. For the law of nations views man under the 
special aspect of social animal (I-II, 95, 4, c.). On the other 
hand, if natural la~ is understood in the third sense, jus gepjium 
will only be distinguished from jus naturale as an immediate con-
clusion from its premia (I-II, 95, 4, c.). 
r 
Firat, the theologian notes that the jus we speak of here is a 
55 
jus in the sense of law and not in the sense of a moral faculty. 
Secondly, this jus gentium is not that of the jurists, of some 
theologians, or of certain "aliqui". Like Vitoria before him, Suarez 
will not admit that jus gentium differs from the natural law in the 
sense that the latter is common to man and beast, while the former is 
proper to man alone. For it is absurd to talk of a natural law which 
. f d d . •t• t 56 ~s oun e ~n sans~ ~ve na ure. Perhaps, then, the distinction will 
be admitted to the theologians who grant intrinsic necessity to jus 
gentium and then distinguish "quia jus natuale sine discursu vel 
facillimo discursu tguis) innotescit; jus autem gentium per plures 
illationes et difficiliores colligitur". 57 Suarez rejects this by re-
48 
calling what he has already proved about the natural law. For all first 
principles of the moral law and their necessary conclusions pertain 
especially to natural law. 57 A third opinion Suarez rejects as being 
founded on the false distinction which facts contradict. This dis-
tinction holds the conclusions of natural law as absolute, nulla 
societate suppositat whereas the precepts of jus gentium are contingent 
on a social order.58 
55 De Leg. II, 17, 2. 
56 Ibid., II, 17, 3-7. 
57 Ibid. 2 II, 17, 8. 
58 Ibid. 2 II, 17, 9. 
Suarez, then, concludes 
r 
Ergo ut jus gentium a naturali distinguatur, 
necesse est ut, etiam supposita tali materia, non 
sequitur per evidentem consequentiam sed per ali-
quam minus certam, ita ut arbitrium humanum et 
moralis commoditas potius quam necessitas inter-
cedat.59 
Are we, then, to think of jus gentium as only permissive or con-
cessive! Suarez forestalls this objection in Chapter 18. He, first, 
notes that those who would deny that jus gentium can command or pro-
49 
hibit, are really mixing the notion of jus as law and jus as a facultas 
moralis. 60 He lays as a first premise, the fact that prohibitive (or 
prescriptive) law cannot be separated from jus concessivum. ~..nd yet 
(his second premise) if the latter is under jus gentium~ then the former 
is und.er the same law. Hence, putting these ideas together, it follows 
that "eo ipso guod uni conceditur, praecipitur aliis ••• n61 
Following this parenthesis, Suarez returns to his main line of 
argument. If jus gentium, he seems to say, is not natural law, then it 
must be positive law. Again he is building on foundations already estab-
62 lished. For although jus gentium does agree with natural law in many 
points, (both apply to men, the matter of both is prescriptive as well 
as concessive, prohibitive as well as permissive),63 yet they are really 
different. And these points bring out the difference; In its affirma-
59 Ibid.'· II, 17, 9. 
60 Ibid. I II, 18, 1 and 2. 
61 Ibid.l II, 18, 5. 
62 Ibid. I I, 3. 
63 Ibid.! II, 19, 1. 
tive and negative precepts 
"non est jus gentium tantum ostensivum, mali-
tiae sed constitutivum: itaque non prohibet mala, 
quia mala sunt, sed prohibendo facit mala. Hae 
autem sunt propriae et quasi essentialee differentiag 
legis: ergo ita differunt jus gentium et naturale". 4 
Whence, arise other differences. The natural law is immutable; jus 
gentium is not. The natural law is of universal application, both as 
65 
to time and place; jus gentium is not so universal. 
50 
Hence, Suarez concludes, jus gentium is positive law and also human 
law. The basis for this conclusion is again found in an earlier co~ 
mentary on St. Thome.s, I-II, 95, 4. For ratione originis law is 
divided into natural and positive law; ratione causae efficientis it is 
divided into human and divine. Both divisions involve contradictories. 
Sed ostensum est legem juris gentium non esse 
naturalem propria et in rigore et consequenter non 
esse divinam: ergo necesse est ut sit positiva et 
humana. 66 
This logic, however, brings the Spanish Jesuit athwart a new problem. 
Jus civile, civil law, is also positive and human. Vfuerein, then, does 
jus gentium differ from it! The answer seems simple: civil law pertains 
to one state; ,jus gentium 2 however, is applice.ble to all states and 
peoples. But following an argument of St. Thomas in the Politics,67 
Suarez himself objects to this distinction as pertaining to the extension 
64 Ibid.J II, 19, 2. 
65 Ibid., II, 19, 2. 
66 Ibid., II, 19, 4. 
67 S. Thomas, Politicorum, Lect. I. 
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and not the comprehension of jus civil~ and gentium. It is evident 
68 
that a distinction ''secundum majus et minus" is only accidental. 
Suarez, therefore, proceeds to distinsuish the two laws. 
Human law is two-fold: 1) written and 2) un-written. (A dis-
51 
tinction already established). Unwritten law, as is clear, is inaugur-
ated by custom, consuetudine; e.nd jus gentium is established by custom, 
cormnon practice, and consent among the nations, "et ita in hoc diffe~ 
ab omni jure civili scripta" ~-69 If, however, there is a law established 
by practice in one nation, it applies only to that nation and 'tdici tur 
etiam civile". 70 Thus, the vthole problem is resolved and Suarez sums up 
Si vero introductum sit moribus omnium gentium, 
et omnes obligat, hac credimus esse jus gentium pro-
prium, quod differat a naturali, quia non naturae sed 
moribus nititur, et a civili etiam distinguitur in 
origine, fundamento, et universalitate, modo expli-
cato.71 
We said the explanation of jus gentium seemed complete but to 
Suarez, as we see from this last quotation, everything is not yet 
settled. The phrase, ttomnes oblige.!" is tell-tale. It is fine to say 
jus gentium is a true law and to distinguish it from other laws, but we 
would like to check on these statements. Obligation, Suarez holds, is 
72 the proximate and adequate effect of law. Arguing, then, from effect 
to ·cause, we can say that, if jus gentium binds, it must be a true law. 
68 De Leg., II, 19, 5. 
69 Ibid., II, 19, 6. 
70 Ibid., II, 19, 6. 
71 Ibid., II, 19, 6. 
72 Ibid., 1, 14; cf. supra p. 16. 
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That the yoke of natural law is always and everywhere binding 
on all peoples we assume here as admitted, and, hence, pass on imme-
diately to jus gentium. 
The obligatory force of jus gentium springs from two sources. The 
first is indirect, the natural law. The second is direct, consuetudo 
itself. To show the first point an example from Suarez will be helpful. 
Receiving ambassadors and recognizing their inviolability is the accepted 
practice of nations, Suarez states. (And this is true even granting 
that there is no necessity under the natural law that nations admit 
legates; even granting that a refusal of legates would be a violation 
of jus gentium, according to Suarez.) It follows from this that once 
ambassadors are admitted in accord with the established practice "contra 
jus natur~le sit non servare illis immunitatem, quia est contra justitiam 
et debitam fidelitatem".73 This is the point Verdross was making when 
he said 
cet dernier (droit des gens) cree par le con-
sentement universal ou quasi universal que lui 
accordant les peuples, est fonda sur le droit 
natural, 1 savoir sur le principe de la fidelit~ 
a ce qu' on a promis, c•est-a-dire sur la regle 
'pacta sunt servanda•.74 
The second font of obligation for jus gentium is, as we saidt 
consuetudo itself. This obligation has two roots. Suarez himself 
73 Ibid.,II, 19, 7. 
74 Verdross, Droit de_le. Paix, 284. 
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demonstrates the first by another example ehowing that treaties and 
international agreements are, indeed, binding once they are made (and 
that ROtius pertinet ad jus naturale75 ) but further insisting that the 
choice of making or not making such pacts, over and above the dictates 
of reason, tttamen usu ipso et jure gentium videtur majus (esse) firm!!:-
tum lt76 __ !..!.,!__ Jus gentium, therefore, has a binding force all its own. 
All of which brings us right back to Section II, 19, 9 from which we 
quoted so copiously above. For, whence is this binding force of jus 
gentium? It follows from the fact of the unity of humanity which in 
turn creates the basis for the family of nations. And this family in 
its turn needs, over and above the natural law, 
specialia jura ••• juri naturali valde pro-
pinqua et quae facillimam habent ab illo deduct-
ionem, adeoque utilem et consentaneam ipsi naturae, 
ut licet non sit evidens deductio tanquam de se 
omnio necessa.ria ad honestatem morum, sit taman 
valde conveniens naturae et de se acceptabilis ab 
omnibus. 77 
The second root of the obligation of consuetudo taps the very notion 
of custom. By definition, consuetudo according to Suarez, is "jus guod-
dam moribus institutum, quod pro lege suscipitur cwn deficit lex".78 
Now, in essence, jus gentium is consuetudo, Suarez maintains. Hence, 
since custom induces an obligation, it follows that jus gentium itself 
75 De Legibus, II, 19, 8. 
76 Ibid. 
77 ~' II, 19, 9. 
78 Ibid., VII, 1, 1. 
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.. is binding. For the proof of the major premise Suarez shows the 
79 definition of Isidore "in rigore competere ,iuri gentium•t. The minor, 
on the contrary, is established by a double argument. 1) Only a per-
feet community, Suarez insists, can establish a custom. \"?hence it 
follows, as he implies, that whenever such a community by concerted 
action sets up a custom, it is expressing its mind which in the given 
case is endowed with legislative power. 80 2) Consuetudo itself par-
takes of "omnia necessaria ad praeceptum et legem ferendam ••• scilic~t 
materia P£Oportionata, potestas, et voluntas sufficienter exterius 
. 'f' t "81 s~gn~ ~ca a • •• The matter is reasonable in the case in point; the 
power is that of the perfect society; the will is manifest by the con-
82 
tinued action involved in establishing a custom. 
original proof stands unimpaired. 
Hence, the 
By way of conclusion we can sum up under three points. The first 
is that Suarez makes a fundamental distinction between natural and posi-
tive international law. The second, a corollary of the arguments on 
obligation, is that jus gentium, the proper name for positive inter-
national law, is a true law and, as true, partakes of justice and 
79 ~' VII, 3, 7. 
80 ~' VII, 9, 6. 
81 ~' VII, 14, 3. 
82 Ibid., VII, 14, 3-6. It is interesting to note that Suarez holds, 
proportionate to the material, the law binds sub grave. This re-
calls Vitoria•s assertion in De Pot. Civili that the same law binds 
under mortal sin. 
r 
•t 83 equ~ y. Hence, "in juris gentium praeceptis servandam esse aequi-
tat em et ,justi tiam (sequitur). 84 Thirdly, the notes of jus gentium, 
defined by Suarez as "jus quod omnes po:euli et gentes variae inter se 
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servare debent", would be: positive, human, unwritten. In a word, Suarez 
speaks of a natural-positive international law. 
With this, we turn to the report of the third member of the Spanish 
,I 
school of international law, Hugo Grotius. 
C. GROTIUS 
Vitoria was a moral theologian applying principles to international 
Indo-Spanish relations; he is the expounder of international law. Suarez 
was a philosopher-jurist driving down to the ultimate in founding inter-
national law; he is its philosopher. Grotius, was a lawyer at the bar 
who drew on precedent; he is the compiler and popularizer of international 
law!35 Grotius, nfather of international law", has often been heard. The 
more accurate estimate of the Dutch jurist's work would be his own, the 
86 
one we have just suggested. For, as John Eppstein well observes, 
Grotius drew heavily on the past and, though a Protestant, he drew heavily 
on the theologians of the Church. 87 
Hugo de Groot, better known under his latinized name, Hugo Grotius, 
83 De Leg. I, II. 
84 Ibid., II, 20, 3. 
85 Scott, Catholic Conception, 127. 
86 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Libri Tres, in "Classics of 
International Law", Oxford, 1925, Proleg., 1. 
87 Eppstein, Catholic Tradition, 99 and 291. 
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was born in 1583. He was beginning when Suarez was reaching his peak. 
He will be at his best about the time of the Jesuit's death, 1617. 
Having tried all learning as his field, Grotius finally took his place 
at the bar about the turn of the century. 
IVhen Grotius was 21, in 1604, a Dutch East India merchant vessel 
captured the Portuguese galleon "Catharina". From this circumstance 
arose the fame of Grotius as international advocate and author. 88 At 
the behest of the East India Company young Grotius prepared a brief for 
the case, which came to the world's knowledge in 1864 when it was dis-
covered and edited by the author's alma mater, the University of Leyden. 
The work was the De Jure Praedae. According to Professor Fruin, whose 
study ~en onnitgegeven werk van Hugo de Groot, 89 is the accepted classic 
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on the point, the De Jure Praedae is an initial model edition of what the 
De Jure Belli ac Facie would be. Further, Fruin's monograph substantiated 
the fact that the Niare Liberum, Grotius' only other considerable work in 
the international field, is nothing more than Chapter 12 of De J~ 
Praedae under separate cover. 
As we seek, then, Grotius' notion of international law, we can safely 
limit our investigation to the final and more mature work of the Dutch 
lawyer, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, for in it we have the other two works 
88 Scott, Law, State, and Int. Com., 521-2 e~d 524-5. 
89 Transle.ted as "An Unpublished Work of Hugo Grotiusn, in Bibliotheca 
Visserana, Vol. v. 
and more. 
Now, Van Vollenhoven, a well-known authority in the history of 
IJetherland international law, has observed that 
11We so often read high eulogies bestowed on 
the book of 1625 in vague and general terms, and 
so seldom concrete characterizations of it ••• "90 
The historian then draws up four points which indicate Grotius' con-
tribution. 
(1) ••• the book judged the conduct of nations 
a>nong each other as it judged the conduct of indi-
viduals, of men. 
(2) ••• Grotius' books ••• tended toward bring-
ing lawlessness to an end over all the world. 
Technically this second quality of the book implies 
that it by no means exclusively deals with what we 
call international law. 
(3) ••• Grotius extended his rules to all nations 
and tribes of the earth. 
(4) It is especially Grotius' fourth doctrine, 
however, which revealed his knowledge of human nature 
••• (He) did not tire of advocating one simple and 
yet most exa.ctin~ rule, a duty of altruism and charity 
between nations.~l 
Hence, although we will expect to find much material not to our 
purpose, we can still study the De Jure Belli ac Pacis to verify Van 
VollAnhoven's last two points. 
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Our etymological definition of international law called this law a 
rule of the inter-relations of nations. Does Grotius study anything 
90 nGrotius and Geneva", in Biblio~heca Vi~~r~, VI, 12. 
91 ~' 13-15. 
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that comes under this wide explanation! At the very outset he tells 
us he is to speak about "jus illud_g_t1_9_<!_ inter populos plures aut 
92 populorum rectores intercedi t ••• '1 And what is the name of this law! 
It is jus gentium "ut quod gentibus tantmn prospicit". 93 For Dr. Ver-
dross, supporting our conclusion as well as indicating the historical 
sequence, says: 
... le droit "inter gentes" est le droit de 
la communaute' internationals ••• Cette conception 
du droit international n'est done que le dernier 
fruit de la grande pense'e universaliste du Moyen 
Age ••• , non seulement Victoris. at Suarez, mais 
aussi Grotius.94 
Such a notion, of course, implies two main considerations: 1) The 
notions of the state and of law; 2) The special nature of this jus 
gentium!. 
Taking these considerations in turn we should find in examining 
them sufficient knowledge of Grotius' international l~w. 
1. First Consideration: Grotius' notion of the ustate" is that of 
95 Aristotle, an autonomous society possessing civil power and sovereignty. 
Further, if we are speaking of those things which the state can do under 
jus gentium (e.g., a declaration of war) that state must be a perfect 
society, "gui sumraa~otestatem habeat in civitate". 96 
92 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prol., 1. 
93 ~' III, 3, 12. 
94 Verdross, Fondement du Droit Int., 255. 
95 De Jure Belli ac Facis 2• I, 3, 6-7; also II, 5, 23. 
96 Ibid., I, 3, 4. 
The notion of Grotius on "law" is three-fold. It may be identi-
fied with that which is right or just;97 it may be identified with jus 
98 
under the aspect of a moral faculty; or lastly, and this is Grotius' 
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strict meaning, it may be a "regula a.ctuum m9ralium obligans a<!_it quod 
99 
rectum est". Thus, briefly, we can consider the first part of 
our examination of Grotius complete. 
2. Second Consideration: We turn, now to examine jus genti~· ~ 
has many divisions. It can best be divided according to Grotius, with 
Ar . t tl i t t 1 d l•t• 1 1 101 ~s o e n o na ura. an vo ~ J.ona awo The former is unique as 
we shall see. The latter, however, admits a further distinction ratione 
102 
causae efficientis into human and divine. Now, divine volitional law 
is either universal or particular,103 while human volitional law has a 
tripartite aspect~ "est ... vel civile, vel latius patens, vel arc-
tius" •104 The civil law applies to the state; the jus arc·.~ius patens is 
that of some imperfect society included in the state, such as the family; 
the j_us latius patens is ",jus gentiurn; id est quod gentium omnium vel 
multarum volw:!.tate vim obligandi accepit".105 
Now, in the very next sentence Grotius adds "Multarum addidi, quia 
97 Ibid., I, 3. 
98 Ibid., I, 1, 4. 
99 Ibid., I, 1, 9, 1. 
100 N.B., jus is henceforth used in Grotius' sense of law. 
101 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, I, 1, 9, 2. 
102 Ibid., I, l, 13. 
103 .Ibid., I, 1, 15. 
104 Ibid., I, 1, 14. 
105 Ibid. 
vix ullum jus reperitur extra jus naturale, quod ipsum quoque gen-
106 
tium dici sol& omnibus gentibus commune''. 'IWo things should be 
noted here. First, the "multarurn addidi". This is especially inter-
eating since Suarez and Vitoria both emphasized the sa~e point. But 
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more of this later. Secondly, Grotius points out for us that, although 
frequently confused, his jus gentium is not natural law. Vie ask, imme-
diately, in what precisely are they different! The question is inno-
cent enough but the answer involves an historical problem as well as 
discussion among the authorities. 
Briefly, the problem is this: Professor Fruin, James B. Scott and 
other men of repute hold that Grotius advanced a consistent doctrine 
throughout his life, from the ~'!re Praedae and the Uare Liberum 
through to the De Jure Belli ac Pacis. For them, the notions in the 
book of 1625 are those of the works of 1608 and 1604. Jean Kosters, 
on the other hand, an authority whose especial work Les Fondements du 
Droit des Gensl07 is cited in the bibliography of almost every author 
appearing in the 66-volume Recueil des Cour~ holds the contrary opinion. 
For him, the doctrine of 1625 is substantially different from that of 
1608 or 1604. 
Now, the solution of this dilemma is neither to our purpose nor 
possible without lengthy digression. Suffice it to say that Fruin and 
106 ~ 
107 In Bibliotheca Viss~rana, Vol. V. 
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followers hold to Grotius' notion of 1us gentium as in the De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis and this Kosters holds, too. The point at issue, then, 
is the evolution of this notion. Hence, if we explain Kosters' "evolu-
tion" theory and, then, the jus gentium of 1625 we will have satisfied 
all parties. 
Jean Kosters states that in the De Jure Praedae, Grotius was a 
follower of Ulpian and his distinction of natural and international law 
(jus gentium): Grotius se range parmi les partisans de la doctrine 
d'Ulpian. 108 
Vfhence does he derive this conclusion! He learns this from an 
exposition of Grotius' notions of the two laws as seen in the 1604 work. 
Here, Grotius maintained that God is the source of law and that His will 
was manifested in His creatures. Here, then, we find the law of nature 
whose fir~t rule is self-preservation; whose second is to procure and 
secure the necessary means thereto. "Tel est le droit natural (pri-
maire), ,jus naturae (prirnarium)".l09 Later on man in society "produit 
le droit natural secondaire. jus naturae secundarium, ou le droit des 
gens primaire, jus gentium_primarium (primum)u.llO 
Besides these two, however, there existed 
••• un droit mixte compos6 d'elements de 
droit des gens et de droit civil, et que, pour 
108 Ibid., 41. 
109 Ibid.' 38. 
110 Ibid., 39. 
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ce motif, on appelle proprement le droit des gens 
secondaire, le ,jus gentium secundarium.lll 
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. . 112 (Grotius, Kosters adds, even subdivides this secondary (JUS gent1um]. 
This is the doctrine of the De Jure Praedae. 
In the De Jure Belli ac Pacis, hov1ever, we find an inn:nediate divi-
113 
sion into natural law and jus gentium. Examining natural law we 
1 d " d 1 d •t . " 114 cone u e se compose one de principes de a ro1 e ra1son • 
Kosters exclaims: 
Voila pour le droit natural. A l'oppose de 
ce que nous voyons dan l'oeuvre de sa jeunesse 
Grotius abandonne maintenant tout a fait la theorie 
d'Ulpien, ••• la distinction entre un dr£i~ natural 
primaire et un droit natural secondaire. 
Hence, 
And turning to jus gentium we see there has been here another about 
face, as Dr. Kosters points out 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
••• cowae droit volontaire, ne concerne pas 
les actions qui sont bonnes ou mauvaises en elles-
memes, mais rend celles - ci obligatoires ou illic-
ites, uniquement parce que ce droit lea commands ou 
les prohibe. Le droit des gens est un, droit humain, 
un droit positif'; il emprunte d'ailleurs sa force 
obligatoire a la volonte unanim! de tous les peuples 
ou de la majorite d' entre eux. 16 
Here, then, a couple of points are explained for us. The evolu-
Ibid.' 39. 
~' 39-40. Ibid.' 43. 
Ibid.' 41. 
Ibid., 45. 
Ibid., 45-6. 
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tion of Grotius' thought according to Kosters, is clarified. The 
distinction between natural law and jus genti~ is manifest. And, by 
way of concluding this rather lengthy expla~ation, we can point out 
one other observation of Jean Kosters. His words are self-explanatory. 
Dans tout cela on ne peut nier, nous 
semble-t-il, !'influence de l'ouvrage de 
Suarez, paru entretemps. 
If, then, jus gentium is not natural law, it must be voluntary 
118 
according to Grotius• division,. that is, positive. And still it 
is not any voluntary or positive law. For, as we saw in Dr. Kosters' 
interpretation, it arises from human will. Hence, it is not divine but 
human voluntary law. 
But a clearer definition of the concept is still necessary, since 
human positive law is three-fold as we saw above. Jus gentium volun-
tari~ is, however, distinguished from jus voluntarium arctius sumEtum, 
since the former obtains in a perfect society; the latter, only in an 
imperfect society. Too, it is distinguished from municipal law; 'trtaque 
haec duo {jus natura}:~E gentill!E:)_no.!L!!Iin~.J.Eter se _quam~~Jvili 
d . . 1 b '" 119 ~scernere_sem~er un~ce a orav~ • lmd how does Grotius achieve his 
120 
purpose? "Civile est guod a potestate civili proficiscitur", and, 
consequently, it applies to one state. Jus gentiwa, however, "est quod 
117 ~' 46. 
118 Grotius uses the word voluntary in opposition to the term natural. 
(cf. Epistle to his Brother, transl. by H. Wright, Bibliotheca 
Visserana, VII, 210. 
119 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prol., 41. 
120 lhid., I, 1, 14, 1. 
·---
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gentium omnium aut multarum voluntate vim obligandi accepit". 
Jus gentium should neither be confused with civil nor natural 
64 
law, then, nor with 11pactis populorum" as Grotius seys in another 
122 place. But we ask, if not from civil power or pacts, whence is this 
law! It is derived from common consent as Grotius affirms in many 
places. 12 3 Dr. Verdro s s, e. gain, speaks to our purpose. 
Hugo Grotius continue la route preparee par 
Vitoria, Suarez, et d'autre theologians moins 
connus comme Soto et Convanuvias ••• La societe 
du genre humain ••• ne peut subsister sans re-
specter quelque sorte de droit, tendant a l'utilite 
de la communaute universelle. Ce droit se divise 
d'apree lui aussi, en droit natural et en droit 
positif. Mais egalement ce dernier, cree par le 
consentement universal ou quasi universal que lui 
accordant les peuples est fonde sur le droit nat-
ural, e. savoir sur le principe de la fid~lite a 
ce qu' on a promis, c'est-a-dire sur la regle 
pacta sunt S~£Vanda.124 
. This last statement admits of three important corrolaries. The 
first is that jus _genti ur.a is founded alike on the natural law and the 
universal consent of the peoples of the world. The second is that this 
law must, originally at lea.st, be unwritten. (Grotius implied this con-
125 
elusion in his Prolegomen~j he actually stated in chapter one of the 
first book that the force of ,ius gentium is derived 11pari modo quo jus 
non scriptum civile, usu continuo ~t testimonio peritorum"~126 
121 Ibid., I, 1, 14, 2. 
122 ~' III, 2, 7. 
123 cf. Ibid. II, 3, 10-11; II, 17, 19; III, 19, 11; Prol., 1 and 17. 
124 Verdross, "Droit de la Paix", 284. 
125 De Jure Belli ac Pacis~ Prol., 26. 
126 Ibid., I, 1, 14, 2. 
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The third corollary is this, derived as much from all we have 
said as from the last quotation: there is an obligation consequent 
on this law of nations. As with other authorities, so with the Dutch 
jurist, this obligation is from the natural law, as well as from jus 
genti~ in its own right. From natural law, because "juris naturae 
f •t t t• If 127 1 s are pac 1s • ''Nam in jure gentium jus naturae includitur, ita 
ut ex omnibus delicti~~.:l.r ... L.J.~ possi t" ._128 From jus gentium 
itself, because: 1) only a perfect society can accomplish a law under 
. t• 129 JUs gen 1umi 2) reasonable necessity demands its observance. 
Nulla est tam valde civi te.s quae non ali-
quando aliorum extra se ope indigere possit ••• 
Si nulla est communitas quae sine jure conser-
vari possit ••• certe et illa quae genus humanum 
~nt.popu!§B complures inter se colligat, jure 
1nd1get. 
And this obligation Grotius insists on (in the face of present-day 
skepticism and Austinian law) as bir1ding even though a sanction be 
For 
wanting. "Neoue taman quamvis a vi destitutum jus omni caret effectu 
The ultimate reason, of course, is that God's justice is not to 
be frustrated. 131 
·As we have heard Grotius and his commentators step by step, so let 
us conclude with a word from him and them, by way of summary: I am 
127 Ibid., Prol., 15; cf. also Prol., 25. 
128 cf. ~' II, 18, 4. 
129 cf. ~' I, 3, 4. 
130 Ibid., Prol., 22-23. 
131 ~' Prol., 20. 
fully convinced, Grotius asserts, that there is a common law among 
132 
nations. Consequently, 
Sicut cujusque civitatis jura utilitatem 
suae civitatis respiciunt, ita inter civitas aut 
omnes, aut plerasque, ex consensu jura quaedam 
nasci potuerunt, et nata apparet, quae utilita-
tem respicerent non coett~ singulorum sed magnae 
illius universitatis. Bt hoc jus est quod gentium 
di~itur1 quoties id nomen a jure naturali distin-gu~mus. 33 
So, there is not only the civil law of the state benefiting its 
citizens but also international law for the benefit of the world com-
munity of states. The term Grotius uses for international law is ~s 
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gentium. The mee.ning of this term is evident to us now as we look back 
over what we have studied. First, "in ,jure gentium ,jus naturae in-
cluditur•t, which, translated into terminology we have been usin~, means 
there is a natural international law. Secondly, ,ius gentium is, 
nevertheless, e. law in its own right. It is positive, human, ex con-
~' for the corr.mon good, and, by implication, unwritten. Or, as 
Kosters states it: "Le droit des gens est un droithumain.l un droit 
positif; ... du droit non ecrit, du droit coutumier". 134 
Having concluded our study of the founders of modern international 
law, we now turn to an analysis of its 20th century defenders. We re-
132 ~' Prol., 28. 
133 Ibid., Prol., 17. N.B. \Vhewell translates jus gentium as 
international law. 
134 Kosters, Les Fondements, 45 and 46. 
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for to the Sovereign Pontiffs who have reigned during the two 
world wars. And first, of course, to Benedict XV. 
D. BENEDICT XV. 
In September, 1914, Giacomo Cardinal della Chiesa was elected 
pope. In the last days of July and the first of August, Europe had 
become involved in its first World War. Providential was the election 
of Benedict XV,-who but four months before had been created a Cardinal. 
A doctor in law from the Royal University in 1875; a specialist in 
diplomacy from the Pontificia Academia dei Nobili Ecclesiastici by 
1883; an experienced diplomat with service in the papal secretariate 
since 1887, Benedict had the legal and diplomatic background most 
helpful in his position.l35 
With the assistance of "an unusually gifted Secretary of State, 
Cardinal Gasparri"l36 Benedict dedicated his pontificate, first, to 
ending the war and negotiating a peace; and, secondly, to pointing 
the way of charity and justice in the conduct of both war and peace. 
Thus in the course of his eight-year pontificate, Benedict called to 
the world's attention the existence of a norm of international con-
duct. What Benedict's conception of this norm was we now wish to 
examine. 
135 Principles of Peace, Selections from Papal Documents, Leo XIII to 
Pius XII, ed. by H. c. Koenig, N C W C, Washington, D.C., 1943, 
P• 126. 
136 ~' P• 127. 
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Now, in counter-distinction to the trinity of the Spanish School 
of international law, the Pope never sat down with express purpose of 
wri"tin::; an organized treatise on law. Hence, our approach to Benedict 
presents a nice problem in historical method. First, from what Bene-
diet said, especially in his peace messages to belligerents, and, 
secondly, from what he and his Cardinal Secretary intimated on various 
occasions, we shall try to piece together a coherent concept of inter-
national law. 
In his first Encyclical letter, Ad BeatissimL_ Benedict points out 
that as 
••• 1l'fe have held it to be our duty at the 
very beginning of our supreme Pontificate, and 
as the first act of our Apostolic ministry, to 
take up and repeat the last words that fell from 
the lips of our predecessor ••• 137 
The Pope makes his own the plea of Pius X. But what was this plea? On 
August 2, almost the very day the war began, Pius X had utte:red his last 
plea for peace. It concluded: 
Vle do exhort the Catholics of the whole 
world to turn ·~· to His throne of grace and 
mercy ••• that God may be moved to pity ••• 
and inspire the supreme rulers of the nations 
with thoughts of peace and not of affliction.138 
137 Ibid., par. 275. N.B. In conformity with Koeni~'s own refer-
~scheme this and all succeeding references to Principles of 
~ will be by paragraph numbers. 
138 ~' 274. 
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One phrase here catches our eye: "thoughts of peace". Surely, Pius 
was not being obscure at such an hour: surely his hearers knew what 
his "thoughts of peace" were. We page back through the papal messages. 
On May 25, 1914 we find the Pope had delivered an allocution to the 
College of Cardinals in which he outlined among other things the 
"thoughts of peace". 
True, there are clever and distinguished 
statesmen who put before themselves the good of 
nations and indeed of human society, and seek by 
common agreement for the means of arresting the 
harm that comes from the strife of classes and 
the slaughters of war, and of securing within and 
without their borders the benefits of peace. 
These, without doubt, are excellent endeavors but 
their councils will bear little fruit unless at 
the same time they can ensure that the precepts of 
justice and Christian charity are deeply rooted in 
souls.l39 
This is the peace message Bene:iict was recalling in his first li:ncycli-
cal. Let us examine the messs.ge carefully, since it contains several 
points of interest. 
1) " ••• statesmen who put before themselves the good of nations and 
indeed of human society •••"• The purpose of diplomacy and all inter-
national relations is thus stated. And from another aspect, the common 
good as a guide for international action is designated. 
2) "••• seek by common agreements ••• within and without their bor-
ders ••• 11 • Here are the means to the end, i.e. common agreements for 
the common good. Note that common agreements could at most be positive 
law in the mind of one trained in Christian philosophy and theology, 
139 Ibid. ' 272. 
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divine, civil, and ecclesiastical law. Note, too, that these agree-
ments are "connnon" and, also, 11Without their borders", that is, be-
tween nations. 
:3) "••• ensure that the precepts of justice and Christian charity are 
deeply rooted •••"• The Pope here states the motivating force in using 
the means to the end in view. "Precepts of justice", for one conver-
sant with the scholastic tradition of thought, would necessarily in-
volve the whole question of reciprocal rights and duties, and, in the 
light of the above, the question of rights and duties in the state and 
between states. uchristis.n charity" harkens back to the interdependence 
brought out by Suarez and Grotius especially. Not to do unto others 
as you would have them do to you is the surest way to national and in-
ternational anarchy. 
With this ~essage taken from his predecessor, Benedict XYl began 
his pontificate. One year later the Pope returned to the same theme 
\Vhy not from this moment weigh with serene 
mind the rights and lawful aspirations of the 
peoples! \Vhy not initiate with good will, an 
exchange of views directly or indirectly, with 
the object of holding in due account, within the 
limits of possibility those rights and aspira-
tions, and thus succeed in putting an end to the 
monstrous struggle ••• The equilibrium of the 
world, and the prosperity and assured tranquillity 
of nations rests upon mutual benevolence and rei4 spect for the rights and the dignity of others. 0 
Peoples still have rights, and, hence, others still have duties. There-
140 Ibid.' 390. 
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fore, why not by exchange of view, thru general agreement, arrive at 
some no~ns for a working international order. That the existence and 
observance of such a law is necessary we can see from this that right 
reason demands ··assured tranquillity of nations" and this in turn 
"rests upon mutual benevolence". Benedict is emphasizing a point 
more fundamental than the positive law pleaded for by his predecessor. 
He is stressing the international application of the natural law. 
"Pacta sunt servandan, he might well have said. For the phrase "en-
trust ••• settlement ••• to reasons of equity and justice" is like 
saying base your rules of international conduct on the natural law. 
Two more years pass. On August 1, 1917 Benedict issued his now 
famous Peace Note to the warring nations, Des le Debut. After showing 
the continuity of his efforts during the three yee.rs of war, the Pope 
announces his "desire to put forward some more concrete and practical 
propositions".141 Without quoting the entire documents, we can examine 
with profit certain selections of this peace message: 
1) "First of all, the fundamental point must be that the moral force 
of right shall be substituted for the material force of arms."142 This 
sounds like the "reasons of equity and justicett of 1915 or Pius X'S 
"precepts of justice" in 1914. Further, in view of his avowed purpose 
to give specific proposals, this first statement is especially inter-
141 Ibid., 525. 
142 ill£.:_, 525. 
&sting. For the Pope seems to be saying to himself that no matter 
how practical the positive laws and agreements are made, they are use-
less unless founded ultimately on the natural law, which must have its 
application in international as well as individual relations. All of 
which brings us back to an idea which our international lawyers of the 
Spanish school have each expressed: there is an international natural 
law. Further, we see here as elsewhere, that the Pope distinguishes 
agreements between nations !rom natural law and yet founds the obliga-
tions of such pacts on the same natural law. 
2) "Let all obstacles to free intercourse of peoples be swept aside, 
143 
in assuring by means of rules, to be fixed in the same way •••" 
~ We break in to ask the meaning of the words •fixed in the same way" 
and the Pope answers: 
"As a substitute for armies, (there should 
be) the institution of arbitration, with its high 
peace-making !unction, subject to the regulations 
to be determined against the State which would re-
fuse either to submit international questions to 
arbitration or to accept its decision."l44 
Note here three things, not new it is true, but put in a different 
light. a) The institution of arbitration follows "regulations agreed 
upon". Whence it follows that such rules are human and positive since 
they are founded on consensus. b) Sanctions are permissible both to 
143 ~' 526. 
144 Ibid., 525. The phrase in brackets is added. 
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give force to the pacts and because the pacts are binding. e) The 
points at issue here are winternational" questions. 
3) In succeeding propositions the Pope constantly speaks of weighing 
cases "justly and equitably"l45 and this with a view to "bringing ••• 
particular interests into harmony with the general welfare of the great 
community of mankind".146 Let us note, again, three things: a) that 
the natural law is ever invoked as the basic principle; b) that this 
norm in effect is the bonum commune; c) that there is an international 
community, mankind, that needs rules. 
This is Benedict's peace plan as viewed from the vantage point of 
international law. Let us turn, now, to the other writings of the Pope 
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or his Secretary of State and see what additional knowledge we can glean. 
In an attempt to guard against the misinterpretations of the papal 
peace proposals Cardinal Gasparri wrote a letter to Lloyd George of 
England and another to Archbishop Ohesnelong of Sans. In various places 
in these letters the Secretary of State brings home one important point, 
namely, that "the only practical ••• way of effecting this (peace and 
international order} is ••• a pact among civilized nationa ••• •.l47 "A 
little good-will• and "by common accord among civilized nations•l48 are 
expressions he uses elsewhere. The Pope was evidently pleading for an 
145 ~' 527; cr. also 528, 529 and 530. 
146 ~. 529. 
147 Ibid., 541. 
148 Ibid., 547. 
international norm but one which was founded on common consent of 
the nations. We ask: is this law different from the natural law! 
The Pope answers, speaking to Archbishop Dobrecic of Antivari 
We have, indeed, no doubt but that those at 
the head of affairs in your kingdom following the 
law of nations and at the same time the voice of 
humanity, are disposed to treat with clemency and 
kindness those most unfortunate men (prisoners of 
war) ••• 149 
Again, addressing Cardinal Vannutelli, dean of the Sacred College, he 
says 
In Our first Encyclical ••• we exhorted the 
Governments of the belligerent nations that ••• 
they should make haste to give back to their 
peoples the life-giving benefits of peace ••• 
But ••• the voice of the friend and the father 
was not listened to; the war continues to ensan-
guine Europe, and not even do men recoil from 
means of attack, on land and on sea, contrary to 
the laws of humanity and to international law.l50 
74 
Obviously, a phrase like the "principles of humanity" means the natural 
law to Benedict.151 
Further, on one occasion Pope Benedict makes a distinction between 
the law of nations and divine law.152 P~d in the case in point, the 
divine law covers ministers of religion and sacred things, whence it 
can be inferred that the divine law here spoken of is divine positive 
law, as opposed to human positive law. 
149 Ibid., 298. 
150 Ibid., 360. 
151 !bid., 383 and 462. 
152 Ibid., 494. 
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Other readings show that the Pope likewise distinguishes be-
tween various types of human positive law. For, not to repeat what 
we have seen in the Pope's peace messages, we can cite several places 
where Benedict uses the term "law of nations" or "international right" 
to mean only a human positive law based on consensus. 
1) "His Holiness ••• has not failed (to 
insist) ••• that the war be conducted in con-
formity with recognized principles by virtue ot 
which open and undefended cities are to be re-
spected and the monuments and churches which form 
their precious treasure are to be safe-guarded 
from all harm:•l53 
2) "The undersigned Secretary of State ot 
His Holiness begs to call the attention of your 
Excellency to the decree by which the Italian 
Government has established that on the data ot 
publication of said decree (August 25, 1916) the 
Palazzo di Venezia, in Rome, becomes property of 
the State. The Holy See does not intend at the 
present moment to consider whether the motives 
given in the decree are sufficient to justify the 
taking possession of the Palazzo di Venezia, either 
in respect to moral law or international right."l54 
3) "But We have already remarked your (the 
Roman Nobility) zeal for justice in the words with 
which ••• you have condemned the methods of war 
which are not in conformity with the dictates of the 
law of nations. In this you have associated your-
selves with Us, who ••• have even recently raised 
our voice against any form of war which, waged on 
undefended cities ••• has made victims among non-
combatants and ••• has damaged the sacred inheritance 
of religion and of art ••• "155 
153 Ibid., 438. 
154 lli!h' 462. 
155 Ibid.' 563. 
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Clearly, the "recognized principles" of example one are the "law of 
nations", or example three since the subject matter referred to 
is the same. However, from example two, where the move of the Italian 
government is unjustifiable "either in respect to moral law or inter-
national right", this law of nations seems to admit a double aspect: 
a natural and a positive. It follows, then, 1) from the terminology 
{moral law, principles of justice, etc.) that the Pope is applying 
natural law to the inter-relations of nations; 2) from the nature of 
many of the examples cited that the law covering them is positive in 
character, set up by agreement among the various nations. 
From what has gone before it seems fairly clear that the norm for 
international order Benedict XV is appealing to is nothing but the 
international law we have seen in Vitoria Suarez, and Grotius. First, 
it is natural; secondly, it is positive. Then, as positive it is human, 
as opposed to divine, positive law; {it is international as opposed to 
intra-national); and it is based on consent. And whence the obligation 
of this international law! Its binding force stems as we ~ 1) from 
pacta sunt servanda, i.e. from the natural law; 2) it stems from uni-
versal consent for the common good, which in turn is based on the exigen-
cies of the community of mankind. The Pope himself seemed to summarize 
his own doctrine in asking prayers for the Paris Peace Conference, When 
he begged 
"that the fruit of the approaching congress 
may be that great gift or heaven which is true 
peace {founded on the principles of Christian 
justice ••• 156 (and) social unity ••• founded on 
natural benevolencen.l57 
E. PIUS XII 
In 1914 we saw Cardinal della Chiesa become Benedict XV. That 
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same year the Pope appointed a young monsignor Secretary of the Sacred 
Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs. The monsignor 
was eminently fitted for his work. He had passed his boyhood with his 
father who was the dean of the Vatican law corps. After ordination he 
had spent several fruitful years as a professor of law in the Roman 
Seminary. Later he was invited by Cardinal Gasparri to enter the papal 
secretariats, where he was occupied at the time of his advance to the 
Papal household in 1914. From 1914 to 1939 the same monsignor, who 
became successively Archbishop, Papal Nuncio, Cardinal and Camerlengo, 
was constantly occupied in the diplomatic work of the Church. On March 
158 2, 1939 this prelate became Pius XII, the reigning Holy Father. 
In office but a few months Pius was confronted with a situation 
similar to that of Benedict XV. He saw war flame up in several quar-
tars in Europe and from thence spread rapidly as an all-consuming con-
flagration, to the entire world, from pole to pole, to every sea and 
land on the globe. 
In the midst of this Pius XII has stood, the guardian of the human 
156 Ibid., 601. 
157 ~' 612. 
158 Ibid., P• 552-3. 
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family, the advocate of order in every sphere of society. It is 
with interest, then, that we turn to a professor of law, a diplomatist, 
the defender of international order for a fina1 word of explanation on 
international law in our own day. 
Pius XII in his first encyclical letter, Summi Pontificatus, dealt 
with the function of the State in the modern world. At the outset he 
tags the basic evil of the political order 
Ac principio, compertum omnino est primum 
altioremque malorum fontem, quibus hodierna af-
flictatur civitas, ex eo scatere, quod universalis 
de morum probitate pernegetur ac rejiciatur norma, 
cum in privata singulorum vita tum in ipsa re pub-
lica, atque in mutuis necessitudinum rationibus, 
quae inter gentes nationesque intercedunt; ipsa 
videlicet naturalis lex detrectatione oblivioneque 
obruitur.l59 
We see immediately that the Pope applies the natural law to individuals, 
to society, to international relations. And wha~ happens when these 
States reject the natural law! "In multiplicatis variisque erroribus 
(incidunt guorum) duo capita peculiari modo ••• considerationi dili-
gentiaegue vestrae proponimus".l60 
The first of these errors is the forgetfulness and rupture of human 
solidarity "quam guidem cum communis origo postulat, ac rationabilis 
omnium hominum naturae aequalitas, ad guaslibet iidem gentes pertineant, 
159 Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XXXI (1939), 423. 
160 ~~ 426. 
In succeeding para-
graphs Pius explains each of these fonts of unity. One passage in 
particular is of interest to us. 
Et cum gentes ad humaniorem cul tum evehantur 
et ••• conditionibus inter se dissimiles fiant 
non idcirco debent humanae familiae unitatem in-
fringere sed eandem potius familiam ••• ditare, 
itemque mutuo illo bonorum commercia, quod solum-
modo efficienterque haberi potest, cum ••• caritas 
omnes ejusdem Patrie filios omnesque eodem divino 
cruore redemptos homines fraterno foedere coag-
mentat.l62 
In subsequent considerations we will have occasion to refer to this 
passage. 
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The second error under which modern society labors is the abso-
lutism of the state.163 Here, again, the Pope develops at some length 
the consequence of this doctrine, on the family, for example, on educa-
tion, on the Church, and religion. And he adds: 
161 Ibid. 
Opinatio illa, Venerabiles Fratres, ••• 
non internae tantum nationum vitae et auctori-
bus componendis incrementis perniciosus error 
evadit, sed mutuis etiam populorum rationibus 
detrimentum affert; quandoquidem unitatem illam 
infringit, qua civitates universae inter se con-
tineantur oportet, gentium jura vi firmitateque 
exuit, atque vitam ••• pacate una simul tran-
quilleque vivere perdifficile reddit.l64 
162 Ibid., 427-8. 
163 Ibid., 430. 
164 ~ 
The human race, the Pope reasons, is in the natural order of 
things divided into separate states and peoples, each independent 
in its own sphere, yet all are bound together (by reason of the unity 
we spoke of above) into a supra-national society. Consequently, for 
the State to assume absolute right, is contrary alike to the natural 
165 
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law and "Eeculiaribus ••• normis" by which the unity and prosperity of 
the human family is maintained.166 
Three passages follow which are especially pertinnent to our in-
vestigation. (We quote the official translations for~asons that will 
appear presently.) 
1) "So, Venerable Brethren, it is indispensable 
••• that the peoples recognize and observe these 
principles of international natural law ••• "167 
2) Such principles demand ••• , further, fidelity 
to compacts agreed upon and sanctioned in con-
formity with the principles of the law of nations.l67 
3) But, on the other hand, to tear the law of 
nations from its anchor in divine law ••• is to 
dethrone that very law ••• 168 
Let us add to this a passage from In Questo Giorno, the Five-Point Peace 
Plan of Pi us XII. 
4) 'We have been forced to witness a series of 
acts irreconcilable alike with the precepts of 
EOsitive international law and those of the law 
of nature ••• 169 
165 ~ 
166 Ibid. 
167 Koenig, OE• cit., paragraph 1430. 
168 Ibid., 1431. 
169 Ibid., 1493. Note: the italics in the above quotations are mine. 
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In speaking of international relations Pius XII, we see, uses 
five different terms: l) "Law of Nations"; 2) "International 
Natural Law"; 3) "Divine Law"; 4) "Positive International Law"; and 
5) "Law of Nature". Were we to understand and, if necessary, recon-
cile this terminology we would have a fairly clear notion of what the 
Holy Father means by international law. 
The terms "international natural law" and positive international 
law" seem most familiar, eo let us start with them. The original Latin 
of the former reads: "••• naturalis juris principia ac normas, quibus 
nationes inter se contineantur ••• •170 The latter phrase is originally 
in Italian and reads: "••• dritto internationale positivo". 171 In 
the first case, the Pope is emphasizing a basic truth which we ~ 
almost taken for granted by Vitoria and Suarez, but which juridical 
positivism of the modern day challenges: there is a natural law, the 
foundation of all positive laws, and this applies not only to men 
personally but also collectively.172 In the second case, the Pope 
shows that he recognizes the necessity of more than general principles 
for governing the interrelations of nations and, hence, postulates a 
positive international law. {We will take up further refinements of 
this notion in a moment under the title "Law of Nations".) 
Now the fifth term, "law of nature", is just another way of saying 
170 A. A. S., XXXI, 554. 
171 Ibid., XXXII, 8. 
172 cf. supra, p. 70. 
the natural law. Hence, when put in original context we see again 
that Pius is opposing a natural law applied to nations and a positive 
law having the same extension. We might note in passing that this is 
the distinction Suarez made when he said the society of nations needs 
a law 
Et quamvis magna ex parte hoc fiat per 
rationem naturalem; non taman sufficienter 
et immediate quoad omnia; ideoque a.liqua. 
specialia jura potuerunt usu earundem gentium 
introduci.l73 
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This very distinction Suarez is making is found again in the third 
passage quoted above, where the Pope speaks of tearing the "law of 
nations from its anchor in divine law •••"· Two steps are required for 
this proof, however. We must show that the divine law as here used 
equals the natural law, and, further, that the law of nations is a 
synonym in the Pope's mind for positive international law. The first 
step is easily shown by reading on in the encyclical. The Pope was 
saying that mutual trust is the pre-requisite for international agree-
mente. Now, he says, to tear the law of nations (according to which 
these agreements are made) away from divine law is to smash the founda-
174 
tiona of human trust. However, he continues, it may be necessary 
to revise treaties once made. If so, let it be done with justice and 
equity, otherwise we will experience the very rending we caution against, 
"the natural order would be destroyed ••• ". 175 The law of this order, 
173 De Legibus, II, 19, 9. 
174 KOenig, op cit., 1431 and 1432. 
175 Ibid., 1432; also 1433 and 1434. 
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of course, is natural law. The synonym used for natural law is 
divine law since ratione causae efficientis both amthe same. 
It remains, then, to clarify the first term, jus gentium. 
In his Christmas allocution of 1939 the Pope mentions l)atroci-
ties; 2) unlawful use of weapons against civilians and refugees; 
3)disregard for dignity, liberty, and life; and 4) anti-Christian 
propaganda, as violations alike of natural and positive international 
la 176 w. 
The following Easter the Pope again stressed the horrors of war: 
1) in undefended cities, towns, and villages terrorized by bombing; 
2) among una~ed citizens, the sick, and the helpless turned out ot 
177 
their homes and often killed. These, the Pope said, were against 
those "Jura ••• guibus excultae gentes inter se continentur•.l78 
These passages would indicate that jus gentium was a collective 
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term in Pius III's writing for natural and positive international 1~. 
However, in an allocution on the Feast of St. Eugene, the Pope mentions 
that respect for life, honor, and property of citizens; for the family 
and its rights, for religion, public and private, should in occupied 
territory be had in conformity with international law and the natural 
176 ~' 1493. 
177 Ibid., 1539. 
178 A. A. s., XXXII, 50. 
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1'79 
order. --The Italian, of which "'international law"' is a transla-
tion, reads diritto delle genti.--180 Here, then, the Holy Father 
seems to distinguish between natural order and jus gentium as between 
natural and positive law. 181 Yet the Pope does not hold this jus to be 
any sort of law. Rather, it is law established by the civilized nations, 
"des accords internationaux"'.182 Consequently, it is a law stemming 
from the consent of men. It is positive and human and founded on gen-
183 
eral agreement. 
There remains but the question of obligation imposed by this law. 
We see the force of the Pope's international law is derived from a double 
source: the ·natural law and the common agreement of the nations. The 
184 law of nations must be anchored in the divine law, as we saw. The 
nations will achieve a stable international organization only when they 
drop "una morale aux fondements purement huma.ine (and) ils acceptant 
tautorit6 supreme du Createur comme base de toute morale individuelle ou 
collective ••• "185 Hence, we repeat with the Pope that •naturalis lex 
(obtinet) ••• in mutius necessitudinum rationibus, guae inter gentes 
nationesgue intercedunt ••• n 186 And, we recall the ever insistent ad-
1'79 Koenig, op. cit., 1567 and 1568. 
180 A. A. s., XXXII, 273. cf. also Koenig, 1644, 1720, 1721 and 1758 
for further confirmation of this interpretation. 
181 A. A. s., XXI, 368-9; also Koenig, 1431. 
182 Ibid., XXXI, 368-9; Koenig, 1514. 
183 KOenig, 1644, 1757, 1758 and 1'761. 
184 ~' 1431. 
185 A. A. s., XXXI, 675. 
186 ~. 423. 
monition of the Pope that any order must of necessity be based on 
187 
mutual trust, the pacta sunt servanda of the three founders of 
modern international law. 
That obligation also flows from consent is at least implied in 
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the Pope's writings. And 'this, first, from the general argument of the 
Summi Pontificatus itself. Herein the Pope shows, as Suarez argued, 
that the nations are bound by the several ties of unity, which create, 
over and above the obligations of the natural law, reciprocal rights 
. 188 
and duties. This same argument is confirmed in an address of the Pope 
to the Knights of Malta: 
Long before civilized nations had established 
international law, a long time before they had 
given reality to the dream - not yet effectuated -
of common force in defense of right and human 
liberty, of the independence of peoples, of peace-
ful equity in their reciprocal relations, the Order 
of st. John ••• had gathered ••• l89 
Here, then, is the international law of which our present Sovereign 
Pontiff is the defender. Its nature: on the one hand, natural and 
on the other, positive. Its force: that of the natural law itself and 
that of the unity190 and (it would seem) the consent of the majority of 
191 peoples. 
187 Koenig, 1431, 1493 et al. 
188 Ibid., 1436 and 1446. 
189 Ibid., 1514. 
190 ~ghes, •The New Encyclical•, Dublin Review, Vol. 206 (1940), 
p. 13. --The whole article is valuable as a summary of the 
argument in the Summi Pontificatus.--
191 ~oenig, 1319. 
* * * 
This last point, which was hinted at previously, we must now 
return to before concluding our consideration of the elements of in-
ternational law. It is the question of the consent of the majority. 
In the De Indis III, Vitoria spoke of •consensus maJoris partie totius 
b .• 192 or 1s • In the De Legibus, Suarez spoke of jus gentium as that law 
on which all agree or "fare omnes•.l93 Grotius explains the same de-
limitation in Book I, l, 14, after the phrase "multarum addidi".194 
The Popes, too, speak of a general agreement among all men or at least 
a majority of them. Why this distinction! Why the insistence on at 
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least '•fere omnes"! The reason appears to be that thus our authorities 
safeguard the true legal nature of their jus gentium. The matter may be 
further clarified in the following few statements. 
l) There is the natural law which applies to men either indi-
vidually or collectively~ Therefore, there can be said to be a natural 
international law. 2) There are rules of international conduct which 
are founded on the consent of all or at least a majority of the nations. 
3) There are treaties which govern the interrelations of two or a few 
states. Both of the latter (the rules and the treaties) are inter-
national, i.e. between nations. But only the first of the two is law. 
192 cr. supra, note 22, p. 37. 
193 De Leg., II, 19, 6. 
194 cr. supra, note 106, p.60. 
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Treaties partake, rather, of the nature of a bi-lateral or multi-
lateral contract. Hence the distinction between statements ~ and 
~ is that made between law properly eo-called and law analogo sensu. 
Rules of the second type are international law strictly; pacts and 
treaties of the third type are international, but only analogically 
law. 
On this last note we end our discussion of the elements. It only 
remains for us to piece the contributions of our quintette together 
into a complete whole, a definition. This definition and its explana-
tion is the work of the final chapter. 
CHAPTER IV. 
THE DEFINITION 
Logicians teach us that a definition according to cause is de-
sirable and useful when at all possible. The reason for this, of 
course, is clear, since an explanation according to ultimate causes 
probes the very ontological foundations of the thing defined. 
Following this general principle, let us use the outline of law 
according to its constitutive parts, which Suarez put at our disposal 
on a previous page,1 and build our definition accordingly. Suarez 
showed us that the constitutive part of law had two elements: an 
internal and an external. The former was the essence of the law; the 
latter were its efficient and final causes. 
What, then, is the essence of international law! What are its 
efficient and final causes! We will draw on the material the founders 
and defenders of international law have furnished us to answer these 
questions. 
1. The essence of the law. When we broke down (in a somewhat 
analogous fashion} the essence of law, we saw that it consisted of a 
materia circa guam, human acts, and a forma, the ordination of the 
legislator's intellect and will. The application to our case is readily 
l cf. supra, P• 44. 
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perceived. The materia circa guam of international law would be the 
acts of the states that constitute the family of nations. For just 
as the acts of individuals, who make up the independent states, are 
subject matter for civil legislation, so too the acts of perfect socie-
ties in international relations are the subject matter of international 
law. This, we can affirm, was the common teaching of our authorities, 
whether we view international law in its natural or positive aspect. 
As for the form, so-called, of international le.w, we can look to that 
ordination of reason which directs the acts of nations to the common 
good of the community of nations. Now, we saw that our consultants were 
in agreement on this particular point even under the dual aspect of 
international law. For, 1) by reason of the natural law internationally 
applied and 2) by positive international legislation the equilibrium 
of global society is achieved. In fact as we heard Suarez clearly say 
earlier 
"Numquam enim illae communitates adeo sunt 
sibi sufficientes singillatim, quin indigeant 
aliquo mutuo juvamine, et societate ••• Hac 
ratione indigeant aliquo jure ••• Et quamvis 
magna ex parte hoc fiat per rationem naturalem; 
non tamen sufficienter et immediate quoad omnia; 
ideoque aliqua specialia jura potuerunt usu earun-
dem gentium introduci. 
From this it is evident, too, that recta ratio here is partly that 
dictamen which God put in human nature itself and partly the consent 
2 De Leg. II, 19, 9. 
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of the majority of the nations of the world. 
From the fact that international law is positive, two other con-
siderations are worth noting in passing. One is that if this law is 
derived from the consent of the majority of nations, it is not one with 
the pacts and treaties which two or three states would make with one 
another. Further, if it is basically ex consensu (and, especially, if 
it is derived from common custom) it will probably be unwritten law, 
as Suarez definitely holds and Vitoria and Grotius also assert. 
Therefore we again haye agreement among our authorities. Inter-
national law for them would be an ordination both as a dictate of nature 
and as a majority consent of the nations. 
This, then, establishes the two internal elements, the essence, 
of international law. But what of its external causes! 
2. The final cause. Here we need not delay, for it is obvious 
that the common good is the object of international law either under 
its natural or positive aspect. For Vitoria, Suarez, and Grotius, as 
well as the Popes, all pointed out the solidarity and unity of the human 
race. And this, they affirmed, not only from the anthropological point 
of view, but especially by reason of a unity of intellect, a social 
nature of man, an insufficiency {particularly today) of the individual 
states, and, finally, by reason of a common Redemption, a Brotherhood 
in Christ and a Fatherhood in God. This, then, is the consensus of 
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opinion among our advisors. This common good of the family of 
nations, therefore, adds a third element to our definition. 
3. The efficient cause. The efficient cause of law, and hence, 
of international law is aptly expressed by St. Thomas in the phrase: 
•ab eo gui curam communitatis habet ••• "3 -According to our authorities, 
the world community lies under a natural and a positive international 
law. Now, the natural law has its "legislator", if we may use the term, 
in hwna.n nature. Hence, we understand why Suarez, Grotius, and Pius 
(also Vitoria and Benedict implicitly) drew analogies between the rela-
tions of individual to state and state to family of nations. The person 
is to the state, they would argue, as the moral person (the state) is to 
the supra-state (the family of nations). 4 
On the other hand, for the legislator of positive international 
law we have but to look back at what we saw at the very end of the last 
chapter. There all the authors spoke of the common or nearly common 
(!ere omnes) consent of the nations. There we find the real efficient 
cause of this aspect of international law. As the people are the proxi-
mate source of authority in the state, so the states are vested with 
authority in the international sphere. As the individuals can delegate 
authority to one or a group, or retain their authority in the body 
politic, so the states can set up a supreme arbiter, a league of nations, 
3 s. Theol., I-II, 90, 4, resp. 
4 cf. same argument in Meyer, Institues Juris Naturalis, Herder, 
Friburg, 1900, II, 749. 
or keep authority in their own hands. Now, ultimately the most 
practical sign of the consent of the governed is the mind or opinion 
of the majority.5 Hence, Suarez and the others insist on at least a 
5 This is true, of course, as long as superior laws are not contra-
dicted. Note: The legal positivist of today would obscure, if 
not deny, the existence of any custom-induced law. The basic 
reason for this is an ill-conceived notion of civil society, in 
general, and of sovereignty in particular. 
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When we are speaking here we are limiting ourselves to a con-
sideration of civil states only, i.e. of those stable moral unions 
of families (and men) which under an independent authority seek to 
achieve common goals in the temporal order by common means. Now, 
for such a moral union to exist, an authority is essential. Further, 
such an authority is essential as can impose a real obligation on 
its subjects, i.e. the authority must be that of a juridical society. 
But, it will be asked, by what right a state can impose obligations 
on its members! In this case, the answer is: ·it imposes obliga-
tions by the authority of the members who have freely granted the 
necessary power to the ruler or group of rulers to direct them.in 
the achievement of the natural goal of civil society. 
It is right here that the connection is made between sovereignty 
of the people and the legal force of custom. For, as Suarez says, 
the efficient cause of a custom is, proximately, the people who 
induce it and, primarily, the power which admits it. Now, from what 
has been said of the people in civil society, it follows that they 
both establish customs and have the authority. Hence, not only do 
they induce customs but they are vested with the necessary author-
ity to admit the customs thus induced. For the people who volun-
tarily act in a reasonable matter and act continually and publically 
after a definite manner, thus induce a custom and really fulfill the 
conditions, as Suarez points out, (De Leg., VII, 9.) necessary to 
lay down a law: l) reasonable subject matter, 2) real authority, 
3) voluntary action. 
But it will be objected, in most states the people once they 
have invested representatives with authority no longer have imme-
diate exercise of that authority. On the contrary, as St. Thomas 
well observes (I-II, 97, 3 ad 3), even in a community already 
under authority ftconsuetudo in tali multitudine praevalens obtinet 
vim legis, in quantum per eos tolleratur ad quos pertinet multi-
tudini le em im onere· ex hoc enim i so videntur a robare uod 
consuetudo introduxit." All this, of course, applies only to a 
custom which introduces an entirely new practice and not to a 
custom that deals with an already existing law. For, in the 
latter case numerous other distinctions are necessary before one 
majority consenting to a certain line of conduct, otherwise legis-
lative power would be lacking. 
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Whence follow two important conclusions: l) That the consent of 
the majority as the signum of the "consent of the governed", enacts a 
true law; 2) that treaties and agreements between two or a few nations 
are not true laws, are not international laws unless, as we showed 
above, the term is analogously applied. 
Two objections might here be raised: The first states that there 
is no instrumental cause, no promulgation connected with positive inter-
national law, especially if un-written. This, however, is seen to be 
false on two scores. For we just said that the consent of the majority 
constituted a signum legis. And, even if the law be un-written, the 
customary actions of men are a sufficient sign of the popular mind, 
and hence an adequate instrumental cause as Suarez specifically pointed 
out. The second objection insists on a more fundamental point. It 
denies positive international law a ratio sufficiens. Again, we have 
seen Suarez handle this very point. He told us that the natural law 
held for international relations but that over and above it special jura 
were needed. In this the Popes, as well as Vitoria and Grotius con-
curred. However, if the argument of ratio sufficiens be based on the 
can determine its legitimacy.) Thus we see, in general, the nexus 
between the sovereignty of the people and the legal force of custom. 
The obvious applications to international law and society need not 
be drawn out. 
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absence of an international society, we recall that this objection, 
too, has bee~ handily answered by the authors. For there is such a 
society. Its basis is, as we saw, the triple unity of mankind. 
Here, is the explanation of and the answer to the chief objections 
against the efficient cause of international law. Here, then, is the 
fourth and final element necessary to constitute a law. It remains for 
us actually to formulate our definition. Or, rather it remains to draw 
into one definition what we have learned from Vitoria, Suarez, Grotius, 
Benedict XV, and Pius XII. It is really their definition. In one sen-
tence, it would read: 
International law is the sum of those ordinations 
prescribed for the common good of the family of 
nations consequent on the natural law, the common 
custom of international society, and the positive 
legislation or at least a majority or these same 
nations. 
* * * 
This is international law as our authors showed it to us. Truly, 
international; truly law. This is the tap-root of the tree of inter-
national relations we spoke of in the beginning of our paper. Then, 
we knew the goal, but not the way. Now, we know the goal, international 
peace; we know the directive norm, international law. Then, we knew of 
order; now we know of international order. And this international or-
der, to conclude on a note sounded at the very outset, this order is the 
work of international law, its tranquillity is the work of justice, 
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